To many of us, the attack of the Russian military on Chechnya has seemed inadvisable. For nearly four years, the Russian government has turned a blind eye to the breakaway province. Only now, in the dead of winter, have they tried to bring the Chechnyian forces under control. The Russian army seems unprepared to confront even a ragtag army making the once mighty Russian military machine appear weak and inept.
When we look behind the headlines, however, we see this venture is necessary and that the Russian army is still a very capable fighting machine able to mount a sophisticated attack.
Ferocity of fighting unexpected
On January 6, 1995, Russian Major General Viktor Vorobyev was killed when a mortar shell exploded next to him in fighting that had grown fiercer by the day. The general was the highest ranking soldier to be killed in a battle that has seen (by official count) 2,500 Chechen fighters and 256 Russian soldiers killed. The New York Times (1/8/95) reports that a more realistic estimate of casualties is 2,000 killed on both sides and many wounded in a month of fighting.
This extremely high casualty rate suggests the Russians had not anticipated the resolve of the Chechnyians to maintain their independence. On the other hand, the Chechnyians are not equipped to defend against high tech weapons.
Western handcuffs
The Russian military began deploying troops in Chechnya in March of 1994. As noted in the New York Times (April 3, 1994), “Russian military has repositioned forces along its northern and southern flanks as they return from Central Europe.”
At the time, the Clinton administration speculated that the moves reflected Russian military unhappiness with the arms control limits negotiated during the Gorbachev era. Still other “Western experts” concluded that the arms were moved into the area to control the ethnic populations in Russia’s own southern territories.
The actions so worried NATO that US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry visited Moscow in March, 1994 to express his concerns. As a result of the meeting, “Russian General Mikhail Kolesnikov, the head of the Russian general staff, proposed a ‘clarification’ of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty that would have the effect of raising the level of forces that could be stationed along Russia’s southern border area” (The New York Times, April 3, 1994).
The 1990 accord sets a ceiling of 580 armored personnel carriers, 700 tanks and 1,280 artillery pieces in its active units in the North Caucuses Military District which encompasses the Chechnyian region. The 1994 compromise allows Russia to ignore the limit on equipment in the Chechnyian region provided the weaponry is controlled by the interior security forces rather than the regular army. The interior security forces are similar to the US National Guard. Most of them are part-time soldiers serving on weekends and being trained once a year. The Russian general who was killed was the commander of the interior forces heading up the assault of the Chechnyian capital.
This is not the regular army
With this background, we can see that a careful reading of the situation is necessary before jumping to conclusions. Bible students may wonder how the Russian army could possibly be thwarted by the Chechnyian irregular forces. They may start questioning the fulfillment of prophecy: “How could an enfeebled Russian army be a central part of the coalition that comes against Israel?” But this is not the regular army fighting in Chechnya.
Money is the motive
The driving force behind the Russian action is financial. One need look no further than a detailed map of the region to note that Chechnya is a major producer, manufacturer and supplier of oil. In addition, the major north-south oil pipeline servicing Moscow runs within 5 miles of Grozny, the capital city.
In 1988, Russian oil production exceeded 10 million barrels a day. During the past eight years, production has decreased at a steady rate so that only 7 million barrels were produced in 1993. The drop in production is equivalent to the total production of the North Sea oil wells. Decreased production combined with a drop in world oil prices has been a major factor in the declining financial fortunes of Russia
Continuing money problems
The Russian financial picture grows dimmer by the day. Two comments in the Toronto Globe and Mail (January 10, 1995) illustrate the problem. On an overall level, “Russia is counting on the $6.25 billion (US) IMF loan to serve as the linchpin of its efforts to slash inflation and put its battered economy back on track.”
At the level of the individual soldier in Chechnya, it was noted that these part-time soldiers are paid a pauper’s wage. As a result, they have been selling their arms to the Chechens in exchange for alcohol and money. “A 19-year old Chechen, Rustan Khutsiav, said he traded 17 bottles of vodka to a Russian soldier for a machine gun. The going rate for Russian grenades is three to four bottles of vodka, he said.”
In spite of appearances in Chechnya, the regular Russian army still has the means to mount a devastating attack in any direction. The financial motivation for such a move grows by the day. Also growing by the day is the need for the return of the Lord Jesus. May he come soon.
The Origin of the Organic World – Part One