Introduction

The question for this discussion is what roles did a woman perform under the Law and in the NT ecclesia. A contested area in this age of equality. T. Gaston has presented an egalitarian reading of the evidence. We shall present the complementarian reading. Gender ‘restriction’ for a role of service is not a topic in the Law; it is just the case that Levitical roles are male; this assignment isn’t a matter for justification under the Law. This is shown by who is talked about, namely, Moses, Aaron, the sons, the fathers and their sons, and males. Whether this pattern is relevant for the ecclesia in the NT or today is a separate question. Therefore, to actually pose the question: Are there explicit gender restrictions on roles of service in the Law? is methodologically flawed; it’s not part of the discourse of the Law.

Methodological Issues

Method is important to an explanation of the difference between egalitarian and complementarian reading and interpretation. We discuss gender and roles today and write reams on the matter but none of this kind of writing is in the Law. To pose the question of gender roles and restrictions in the Law misunderstands the material that we have in the Law. We need to show that the question is appropriate to the material, but this is not done in Gaston’s essay.

Good method will be aware of assumptions in reading. A case in point is pronouns. Today we are sensitive to masculine and feminine pronouns and the issue of gender inclusivity. The dominance of the masculine pronoun in the drafting of the Law is evidence that the society was patriarchal, but whether the masculine pronoun is going proxy for men and women, or just men, is determined by context. The Nazirite Vow is a case where nouns (‘men’ and ‘women’) supply the reference for the masculine pronoun.

Gaston notes the problem of arguments from silence. We should also note the problem of imposing standards from our culture upon a text. For example, we might think the Law should formulate its prescriptions about priesthood with regard to gender. We might argue from the absence of language ‘restricting’ priesthood to a gender that such a role could be performed by either gender. This would be a mistake because those addressed in the priesthood regulations are Aaron, his sons, and the fathers and sons of the Levites. This is a comment about the inspired framing of the Law, but it also reflects the patriarchal nature of Israelite society.

Silence can be telling, but it may tell us what we want to be told. If we want no gender specific prescriptions, we may be told this, but this is where we fail to step back and see that the priesthood Laws are framed for a certain tribe and its males.

Methodological issues will appear at different points below because part of the debate between egalitarian and complementarian interpretation is how to read.

Could a woman be a priest?

Lexicons list the semantic range of words. Context disambiguates the use of words. This contextual usage is decisive for interpretation. Gaston sets out the decisive contextually defined ‘fathers and sons’ evidence for the male priesthood. After noting the passing of the high priesthood from father to son, he adds a comparison “as with property rights”. This then allows the observation that a daughter could inherit before uncles. However, he needs to show that we can compare a role (priesthood) with property, otherwise this looks like a red herring.

Leviticus 21 and 22 have restrictions and regulations relating to priests, including shaving and beards (21:5), the taking of a wife (21:7, 13), male blemishes (21:17), testicular deformities (21:20), and so on. One of the causes of uncleanness is male ejaculate (22:4). Gaston says, “these chapters are written in the masculine gender, no explicit restriction is issued about the gender of the priests.” We need to step back and ask: what would be an ‘explicit’ restriction? We are not in a position to impose a definition. What we find in the text is that the masculine pronoun, the word for a male, and male specific restrictions are noted. Sisters and daughters are mentioned as relations of the priest. To note that there is no explicit restriction issued about the gender of the priests, places upon the text an observation, the relevance of which has not been shown. Any relevance for the observation seems motivated by modern concerns. The inspired framework for regulating the priests is completely male focused. The telling silence is this: had there been women priests, or were it the case that women could be priests, then there would have been regulations relating to and including women. The content of the Law actually does tell us the attitude of God about gender and priesthood.

Again, it is important to look at the contextual use of ‘sons of Aaron’. In Leviticus 21 and 22 these are not his sons and daughters, but just his sons. This is shown by all the male orientated detail of the priestly regulations. Gaston says that Lev 6:18 “illustrates the point that the phrase “Aaron and his sons” could have been used to include both genders and is not an explicit restriction on the gender of the role.” This is misleading because it talks about lexical information (a ‘could’) rather than the use of the phrase in a context like the priestly regulations. The contextual information is different in Lev 6:18 (it is “All the males among the children of Aaron”) as opposed to Leviticus 21 and 22; hence, there is no argument here for the possibility of women priests.

The same kind of mistake is made with Gaston’s next point. He says, “Similarly, the sin offering was permitted to be eaten by “all the males among the priests” (Lev 6:29; cf. 7:6), implying that the term ‘priests’ was often used to cover the whole priestly family and does not (in itself) imply just males.” That priests had families, wives and children, sons and daughters, is unexceptionable. That the plural ‘priests’ might be used to refer to priestly families does not mean that the singular ‘priest’ could refer to a female priest. This usage has to be established from examples in the regulations. These regulations are clear in their restriction of the priesthood to males as shown by the instructions about the eating of offerings. If women could be priests, why would they be excluded as priests from eating the offerings? When females are mentioned, it is similarly explicit – daughters of priests in certain circumstances are permitted to eat of the offering (Lev 22:12-13) and the ‘priest’ here is her father. We can be guilty of imposing an external standard of what would count as ‘explicit’ in order to give the impression that matters are unclear when what we have to do is recognise how matters are in fact clear.

The same mistake in reading is found in Gaston’s treatment of Numbers 4, which is all about the taking down of tabernacle. The language is of “X and his sons (ynb)” but Gaston says that there is “no explicit reference to gender”. This begs the question as to whether ynb  has the meaning ‘sons’ in this context. If it does, then matters are explicit. If it means ‘children’, then this embraces male and female. The fact that lexically the term can be either does not imply it is ambiguous in context. When we look at the context of taking down and putting up the tabernacle, it seems clear we have, correctly, ‘X and his sons’. What is interesting is that the age of service for ‘entry’ into the service of the tabernacle, 30 years to 50 years, is given in a chapter where physical work, some of it heavy-lifting, is described (e.g. Num 4:19 “Aaron and his sons shall go in, and appoint them every one to his service and to his burden”).

What about the example of women at the entrance of the tabernacle (Exod 38:8; 1 Sam 2:22)? Obviously, ‘service[1] at the entrance’ is not ‘service of the tabernacle’ nor is it necessarily ‘Levitical’ or ‘priestly’. Gaston has no grounds for saying “If the service of the non-priestly Levites was reserved to carrying (and I don’t think this is certain) then the service performed by the women at the entrance to the Tabernacle would be specifically priestly service.” To show ‘Levitical’ or ‘priestly’ service, we would need at least some information to this effect, but we have nothing in this verse. In contrast, Numbers 4:23, 35, 39, 43 and 8:24 are about ‘entering’ the tabernacle or ‘entering’ the service of the tabernacle, and the pattern of the instructions is for sons ‘to enter’ (hence the masculine pronoun, Num 4:19).

What needs to be shown is that the ‘service/assembling’ of women at the entrance actually involved ritual functions. Nothing is put forward by Gaston to show that such service/assembling was for ritual functions. The equation is just assumed. If we take the examples of ‘ritual functions’ at the door, it is clear from the context who is involved: Exod 29:4; 40:12 are about the consecration of the high priest by Moses and therefore use the 2p masc. sing; Lev 14:11, 23 identifies ‘priests’ as those performing the ritual; Exod 29:42 involves the altar (v. 38) which was inside the tabernacle court; women were outside by the entrance; and Lev 12:6, 15:14; 29 have men and women bringing offerings to the priest at the door, which is to expected and not the ‘ritual’ of the tabernacle.

We cannot say the ‘service/assembly’ at the entrance was gender specific; we can say we have no information on what was happening. Why were women excluded from Levitical and priestly duties in the tabernacle? Gaston finishes his section on women priests with plenty of unambiguous information about practical matters to do with women, matters which might offer an explanation of their exclusion. Typologically, we might root the priesthood of the male in the headship of the man Christ Jesus. If we are inclined to be sociological, we might say that the historically Israel were simply a patriarchal society.

The Roles of Women in the Ecclesia

This is well-worn topic and there is nothing new to add in rebuttal except for one point (below). Women were equally bestowed with the Spirit and prophesied. The debate here is about at which gatherings of the church this happened. Whether Junia (Junias?) was an apostle or not is a hoary old chestnut, but the pattern of male apostles makes this unlikely, making Paul’s remark mean that she was noted by the apostles. As for overseers/elders, the criteria of selection are explicit enough in specifying the husbands of one wife. Gaston says “no explicit restriction is given against women being overseers” but this is implied in the positive selection criteria: the absence of a negatively specified criterion against women is a moot observation.

What about deacons? They are to be the husbands of one wife which begs the question about Phoebe. Was she a deacon? There are two points to make here: first, a historical exception should not trump the clear advice in Titus. There is a qualitative difference between later instructions for appointing elders and servants, which are exclusively male, and earlier historical evidence that a woman was a ‘deacon’ at Cenchrea. Secondly, was she a deacon? The problem here is that the Greek word is the common word for ‘servant’ and we do not know if Phoebe’s service was that of an office-holder as in Titus.

Conclusion

Have we found explicit proscriptions that prevent women being priests, overseers, elders and deacons? The honest answer is Yes. The difference to mark is that between positive and negative proscriptions. Our positive proscriptions prevent a woman from being a priest, overseer, elder and deacon, but we have no negative proscriptions saying that they cannot be in any of these roles. Our point is that the absence of such negative proscription is moot.

[1] The KJV choice of ‘assembly, assembling’ is just as likely.

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