In the first article of this series (Jan 2015), we considered ad hominem arguments (against the person); in the second article (Apr 2015), we looked at confirmation bias which can be used as an ad hominem argument. Our goal was to distinguish logic from psychology and emphasize that if we are going to keep a clear focus on truth and falsity, we need to be careful how we deploy psychological descriptions of an opponent. This article is concerned with the phenomenon of ‘motivated reasoning’.
The Wikipedia entry for ‘motivated reasoning’ is underdeveloped but it is a start. “Motivated reasoning is an emotion-biased decision-making phenomenon studied in cognitive science and social psychology. [Cited April 2015]” The phrase is self-explanatory – people are strongly motivated to reason in a certain way – one that favours their existing beliefs and minimizes cognitive dissonance. The ‘Sceptic’s Dictionary’ website says,
“Motivated reasoning is confirmation bias taken to the next level. Motivated reasoning leads people to confirm what they already believe, while ignoring contrary data. But it also drives people to develop elaborate rationalizations to justify holding beliefs that logic and evidence have shown to be wrong. Motivated reasoning responds defensively to contrary evidence, actively discrediting such evidence or its source without logical or evidentiary justification. Clearly, motivated reasoning is emotion driven. It seems to be assumed by social scientists that motivated reasoning is driven by a desire to avoid cognitive dissonance.” [Cited April 2015]
The focus here is on the person and if you are accused of motivated reasoning in an argument you should recognize that this is an ad hominem argument. This could be helpful; maybe you are biased and not appreciating the other person’s point of view. Equally, the other person may be putting you in a pigeon-hole because they themselves are motivated to see their point of view prevail and this is the way that they can avoid your argument. A standard debating tactic is to turn on ‘the man’ when your case is weak or the opponent’s is strong.
Being strongly motivated to defend your religious beliefs might be considered a good thing, but if the beliefs are false, you will be admired or pitied for your sincerity, and labelled as someone who shows motivated reasoning. The implicit values being recommended here are the ones of dispassionate and neutral appraisal of the data.
The situation is more complex, of course, because religious believers experience doubt at the same time as they hold to certain beliefs, and so they live with a measure of cognitive dissonance. Many religious believers will defend their beliefs while acknowledging the contrary point of view. It is too easy to dismiss the defence of a religious belief as motivated reasoning; you may be missing the truth of the matter.
In order for a charge of motivated reasoning to stick, the case against you has to be substantial and widely held. This is a problematic proposal for minority religious beliefs such as Judaism, or a minority sect in Christianity. Maybe intra-religious differences should be an exception. Maybe we should allow passionate and motivated reasoning for this or that religious belief amongst believers. Another way to defend a charge of motivated reasoning could be to say that the scientific case against you is substantial and widely held. This approach would mean that there is no deficiency in arguing passionately for a minority reading of John 1 consistent with your Biblical Unitarianism against the dominant Trinitarian views; but it would mean that your reasoning was defective if you argued against a dominant scientific view. The online ‘Sceptic’s Dictionary’ lists creationism along with a selection of conspiracy theories as examples of motivated reasoning. However, the strategy is rather self-serving, and the clue is in the title: it is the sceptic who has a vested interest in coupling advocacy of a scientific consensus with a charge of motivated reasoning towards special creationists.
Since we are interested in truth and truth is a matter determined by logic and not psychology, our example showing that a charge of motivated reasoning fails the logic test comes from N. T. Wright and his doctoral thesis published as The Climax of the Covenant (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991). The quote is long but it delivers the death-knell to someone who ignores your argument and accuses you of motivated reasoning:
What is a rationalization? An argument, presumably, designed to lead to a conclusion already reached by the writer or speaker on different grounds. (One of the greatest advantages, and temptations, of an academic education is the ability it gives one not only to produce cunning rationalizations of ideas, or courses of action, which one wants to assert or pursue for oneself, but also to ruthlessly expose those of others.) When put like that, ‘rationalization’ seems clearly a term of abuse, strong enough indeed to knock down an entire line of thought: ‘you only say that because you want to remain a good Calvinist/Lutheran/liberal/conservative’. But this weapon has too light a trigger. Unless we are simply arational beings, in which case we might as well stop talking altogether, there will always be reasons for what we say, and having such reasons can hardly be in every case an argument against saying anything at all. One is reminded of C. S. Lewis’ reductio ad absurdum for this sort of thing:
‘Now tell me, someone, what is argument?’
There was a confused murmur.
‘Come, come,’ said the jailor. ‘You must know your catechisms by now.
You there, what is argument?’
‘Argument is the attempted rationalization of the arguer’s desires.’
‘Very good,’ replied the jailor, ‘but you should turn out your toes and put your hands behind your back. That is better. Now: what is the proper answer to an argument proving the existence of the Landlord?’ [i.e. God]
‘The proper answer is, “You say that because you are a Steward.”’ [Priest]…
‘Good. Now just one more. What is the answer to an argument turning on the belief that two and two make four?’
‘The answer is, “You say that because you are a mathematician.”’
‘You are a very good boy,’ said the jailor. ‘And when I come back I shall bring you something nice…’
(The Pilgrim’s Regress: An Allegorical Apology for Christianity, 2nd ed.; London: Geoffrey Bles, 1943, pp. 62-63; The ‘jailor’ is of course Freud.)
Not only is the cry ‘rationalization’ likely to prove too much. It frequently invokes a quite unwarranted slur on an argument. (p. 10)
Wright is concerned with rationalization after the event – how Paul came to rationalize his beliefs after the event of his Damascus Road conversion. People may come to believe things for all sorts of reasons and only subsequently supply rationalizations for those beliefs. Moreover, these rationalizations may not be for their benefit but for the benefit of those they seek to persuade or educate. This does not make the rationalization good or bad. Hence, the dismissal of their reasoning as ‘motivated’ is just a side-stepping strategy. It is not ‘of Christ’ but ‘of the sceptic’.
The Solution