Introduction
In this article we will explore the idea of consensus both from a scholarly perspective and an ecclesial point of view. How much weight does scholarly consensus carry in the field of Biblical Studies and how should we use the consensus from the Biblical Studies context within the ecclesia?
Philosophy
A recent introductory book for undergraduates in Philosophy offers readers four ‘Philosophical Virtues’ as follows,
- Think for yourself and allow your views to be guided by critically assessing the range of genuine arguments for and against them, and by learning from what others have said who have thought deeply about the issues.
- Be prepared to question views even when they seem obvious, are believed by many others, have been believed for a long time, or are beliefs that you hold dear or through habit.
- Keep a truly open mind by being willing to change your views according to the merits of the arguments and don’t be driven into a corner in defending a position dogmatically even when you feel the argument is running against you.
- Acknowledge that an intelligent and honest person may hold views different or opposed to yours.[1]
There is useful and pithy advice here but a qualification is needed for those who hold to the faith of the ‘apostles and prophets’. The qualification is that, having believed the faith, we should hold to it and advocate it with conviction. This virtue means that we are not ‘open’ to change on the fundamentals of the faith; it qualifies the ‘complete openness of mind’ advocated in these four philosophical virtues. Having said this, the four virtues are salutatory and an expression of the counsel to ‘try the spirits’. In particular, they focus on the primacy of argument in establishing what we should believe as opposed to merely accepting authority. This is relevant to our topic of ‘consensus’, since the second virtue counsels that we should be prepared to question beliefs even if they are held by many others whilst still, according to the first virtue, learning from others. The mind-set might here might appear to be just a cliché, but it is specifically philosophical in the sense that it is taught in the philosophical academy.
The nature of learning in undergraduate philosophy courses is different to that in Biblical Studies courses and this is not just because the subject matter is different. The difference we are noting is reflected by the four virtues: they are integral to the method in which the subject matter of Philosophy is approached. The learning is not ‘authority-driven’ but ‘argument-driven’. Biblical Studies is somewhat different with authorities and consensus playing a greater part in the learning process for the student. We might wonder about the reasons for this difference, but for those who have gone through the system in both academic disciplines, the difference will be apparent. A trivial but telling illustration of the difference can be seen in the quantity of footnotes in typical journal articles for each discipline. Philosophy articles will have substantially less references to past or contemporary thinkers than a Biblical Studies paper. This is because a much greater proportion of the Philosophy paper is about argument, making and creating new arguments about a problem. Biblical Studies papers will be a lot more about what has been said on a text by scholarship past and present and, maybe also—the church fathers and the theologians before the rise of Biblical Criticism in the German Enlightenment. In terms of the culture of Biblical Studies, the student is handling ‘what people have said’ to a far greater extent than in Philosophy. The upshot of this is that there is engendered a greater respect for authorities in scholarship. The student is directed by his/her teachers far more to what the leading figures past and present say than to the business of assessing argument. In Philosophy, the mind-set is reversed: the student is challenged far more to rebut what the ‘greats’ have said on a topic.
Scholarly Consensus
An appeal to the ‘scholarly consensus’ is often used to influence or settle the outcome of a particular line of inquiry. Leaving aside the question of how the consensus was reached (who was included/excluded), and who contributed to the consensus (specialists, etc.), the field of Biblical Studies is littered with hypotheses that were the generally accepted consensus but later overturned when a ‘paradigm shift’ in thinking occurred—usually when the status quo was challenged by an individual who refused to accept the norm. Scholarship follows trends in the same way that some follow fashion, and professional tenure and career progression are often linked with reflecting an institutional view or a fashion.[2]
We might think here of German scholarship and the Tübingen school of F. C. Baur of the early 19th century that read the NT through the eyes of Hegelian historical analysis;[3] or the Wellhausen documentary hypothesis which no longer dominates the debate about the origins of the Pentateuch as it did for the first two thirds of the 20th century;[4] or, more recently, the centuries old consensus on Paul’s perspective on the Torah and his understanding of ‘justification by faith’ which was overturned in 1977 by E. Sander’s Paul and Palestinian Judaism;[5] or again, in Isaianic study, the consensus has moved away from tri-partite authorship towards more eclectic models of composition.[6] These are just a few examples of a shift in the consensus view; many others could be added by simply reviewing the ‘histories of research’ written by academics. As M. Goodacre has noted, the appeal to consensus is often motivated by a refusal to think for oneself:
As someone standing outside the consensus on one major issue (the Synoptic Problem), I have found it frustrating to see appeals to consensus used as an excuse for a refusal to think. Indeed, I have argued that the repetition of the consensus view simply because it is the consensus view is one of the things that has contributed to the dominance of that view.[7]
A factor that leads to Goodacre’s problem is the specialization of research. As students increasingly specialize, they cannot challenge ‘results’ and the ‘consensus’ in neighbouring areas of study, and so reproduce this in their own work. On the largest scale, this is seen in the work of NT scholars who regularly use and cite OT scholars for their opinions and understanding. For example, it is not uncommon to see the terminology of OT scholarship innocently attributed to NT writers as their understanding, for instance, that Luke quotes from ‘Second Isaiah’ (when, of course, Luke would have had no knowledge of such a hypothetical individual).
When to use scholarly consensus?
Scholarly consensus has usefulness. It informs as to what a majority thinks at a given time, but it cannot guarantee an insight to truth. It gives a starting point. It can, for example, be useful to point out that there is ‘no consensus’ in a certain area (i.e., on the question of Johannine knowledge of the Synoptics) or, that if a certain area has a reached a scholarly consensus, then that view deserves serious consideration. However, a ‘consensus’ view does not thereby legitimize itself or rule out minority objections—nevertheless, it does mean that substantial arguments must be brought to bear to overturn a consensus.
When identifying the ‘consensus’ on a topic, it is worth bearing in mind that ‘specialists’ disagree amongst themselves, and that a consensus view is a filtered and oversimplified version of the facts, with the ‘specialists’ admitting to the proverbial truth, ‘the more you know, the more you realise how little you know’. This is an important point and it is illustrated in at least two ways. First, academic work is simplified and often given a consensus appearance in introductory texts for the general public. Secondly, in the research journals, matters are presented as more complicated and hedged about with qualifications and caveats. This will certainly be seen in oral presentations, forums and conference exchanges, as well as in private conversations between scholars. A consensus view is a helpful guideline for a general reader, but the truth of the matter could lie elsewhere.
Goodacre (quoting Herd) notes:
In my opinion, academics should immediately abandon the practice of using phrases like “It is generally agreed …” as if those were arguments in favor of what follows. Sentences in the form “It is generally accepted that P,” if they are true, serve at best as useful “tag lines” to a summary description of the state of scholarship on a particular topic (or public opinion, or whatever is under discussion). However, sentences like “It is generally accepted that P” can never prove the truth of P, because the number of people who agree that P is true is actually irrelevant to the question of whether or not P is true. Besides that, it seems to me that statements like “It is generally accepted that P” are quite often not true as they stand—by which I mean that P is often not as “generally accepted” as the statement claims.[8]
Goodacre is describing the ‘genetic fallacy’—a fallacy in argument that tries to prove a conclusion by citing authority rather than constructing premises that go towards establishing the truth of a conclusion. Hence, the philosophical virtues that we cited first in this article need to be borne in mind.
Conclusion
A consensus in biblical scholarship is important information, as are the credentials of a professional academic being consulted,[9] but it is not always true that the majority is right, and a consensus view of itself should not settle a question. Only assessment of arguments can settle a question.
[1] J. Shand, “Introduction” in Central Issues of Philosophy (ed. J. Shand; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 1-9 (6).
[2] This is true in Biblical Studies and Philosophy; patronage is also very important, as is the influence and needs of the people already in post at an institution seeking to fill vacancies. See B. Martin, “Academic Patronage” in International Journal for Educational Integrity 5/1 (2009): 3–19.
[3] See S. Neill, The Interpretation of the New Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), chap. 1.
[4] See R. E. Clements, A Century of Old Testament Study (London: Lutterworth Press, 1976), chap. 2; G. J. Wenham, “Pondering the Pentateuch: The Search for a New Paradigm” in The Face of Old Testament Studies (eds. D. W. Baker and B. T. Arnold; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic; 1999), 116-144.
[5] E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism (London: SCM Press, 1977). Today, as the generation of scholars who promoted this new perspective on Paul leave the academic scene, it is being challenged.
[6] See M. A. Sweeney, “The Book of Isaiah in Recent Research” in Recent Research on the Major Prophets (ed. A. J. Hauser; Sheffield: Phoenix Press, 2008).
[7] M. Goodacre’s (Duke University) academic blog, focusing on the ‘New Testament and Christian Origins’.
[8] Ibid, (emphasis added).
[9] In the academic world of biblical scholarship, the credentials that a scholar has are acquired by their teaching and writing; in theory, the rewards are recognition and advancement up the academic ladder to more prestigious positions in more prestigious institutions. Many academics have the same professional titles (or variations) such as ‘Dr.’, ‘Prof.’ or ‘Reader’, but they are not equal in their credentials.
Fellowship with the Maker and Brethren