Introduction
In 2003, the Evangelical Quarterly published an article entitled “The Christadelphians and the Doctrine of the Trinity”.[1] The article was written by J. Clementson, a former Christadelphian turned evangelical, with the expressed aim of finding “constructive alternatives” in language to aid Christadelphians in understanding and accepting the Trinity. In this present article I intend to explore the issues raised by Clementson.
Evangelicalism
Clementson begins his article with a fair description of the origins of the Christadelphian movement, followed by summary of Christadelphian beliefs about Christ and the Holy Spirit.[2]A comparable analysis of the evangelical movement is not possible here, but a few general comments will be useful.
Evangelicalism may be defined as a theological system that puts emphasis of personal faith and conversion (being “born again”) and the authority of the Bible. Nevertheless, the term carries a certain degree of ambiguity and can refer to a spectrum of beliefs. Belief in the tri-unity of God is one of the core tenets of the evangelical movements; it appears top of most evangelical statements of faith.[3] This emphasis on the doctrine of the Trinity may in part be explained as a reaction to apathy shown to the Trinity by the Protestant churches during the 18th and 19th centuries. It may also be a result of the significance placed on the doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement.
The evangelical emphasis on the authority of the Bible is something that they have in common with Christadelphians, in contrast to the authority given to tradition in the Catholic and High Anglican churches. It is ironic, then, that the evangelicals, including Clementson himself, often refer to the creeds and councils of Catholic Church to define and defend the doctrine of the Trinity.[4]
Sonship
Clementson writes, “The Christadelphian understanding of Jesus as the Son of God places much more emphasis on his virginal conception than does the New Testament” (p. 166). Whether or not this assessment is fair, it is nonetheless irrelevant since the issue of sonship is about ontology rather than an emphasis. The divine affirmations of Jesus’ sonship at his baptism (Mark 1:9-11) and resurrection (Acts 13:33) do not explain how Jesus came to be the Son of God. It is the virginal conception of Jesus that explains both how he came to be and how he came to be the Son. The burden is upon evangelicals to find an understanding of sonship that coheres with their belief in the eternity and equality of the Father and the Son.
Clementson puts much emphasis of the Johannine presentation of a pre-existent relationship between the Father and the Son (pp. 166, 169), arguing that Christadelphians did not give full significance to the Son. Yet he undermines his own argument in his attempt to argue that “Jesus does not speak on behalf of the Father” (p. 169). This is exactly what Jesus claimed to do: “I have not spoken on my own authority, but the Father who sent me gave me a command, what I should say and what I should speak” (John 12:49). Though we can agree that the Son should be distinguished from the angels and prophets who previously spoke on God’s behalf, it is no denial of the Son to give preeminence to the Father.
The next argument is patristic, not Biblical: “the early church fathers concluded in the process of opposing Arius, if Jesus came to reveal the Fatherhood of God, then that Fatherhood must be intrinsic to God himself. And if God has always been Father, then he has always had a Son” (p. 170). This argument rests on the assumption that the content of temporal revelation is to be equated with ontological necessity; i.e. if God is a father, then to be God is to be father, therefore God was eternally father. The fallacy of the argument is demonstrated if we replace the concept of fatherhood with that of creation. If God is a creator, then (by this argument) to be God is to be creator, therefore God was eternally creating. Yet it is the teaching of the Bible, and generally accepted by Christians, that the world was created in time. Whilst God always had the power to create, there was not always a creation. Whilst God always had the power to “father” a child, there was not always a Son.
Pre-existence
Clementson notes the Christadelphian interpretation of Phil 2:6-8, that it refers to decisions made by a human Jesus not a pre-existent Son. He acknowledges that this opinion is shared by J. D. G. Dunn,[5] but gives preference to N. T. Wright, who argues that here is a non-human choosing to become human.[6] Thus, Clementson concludes, “the Christadelphian interpretation fails adequately to explain the reference to becoming human” (p. 167). However, it should be acknowledged that Paul does not say that Jesus took on the “form of a man” but the “form of a servant” – this was his choice. The “becoming in the likeness of men” is unlikely to refer to a change in nature since Paul refers only to “likeness” (homoiomati), not to form or nature. This being the case, it is likely that here Paul talking about the outward appearance (clothes, mannerisms, etc.). No pre-existence need be implied.
Regarding Col 1:15-20, Clementson chastises Christadelphians for missing the allusion to Wisdom 7:25-26 due to “an unwillingness to consult any non-canonical sources” (p. 166). In fairness, most Christadelphians are probably ignorant of the views of modern biblical scholarship regarding the influence of Wisdom literature in early Christology. Even if we concede that possibly Paul, and certainly John, identified Jesus with a personified attribute of God,[7] it is not clear how this furthers the doctrine of Trinity. A personified attribute cannot make conscious choices to become human (see above).
Three Christadelphian objections to the concept of the pre-existent Son are noted, though the commonest is not mentioned – that Christadelphians do not find the pre-existent Son in the Bible. The first objection is “that God cannot be two (or three) persons because he is one” – more on this later. The second is “that a truly human person cannot pre-exist”, to which Clementson responds that this is based upon a misunderstanding of Trinitarian doctrine: the human being called Jesus did not pre-exist, only the divine Son pre-existed. Clementson blames “popular Trinitarian language” for leaving itself open to such misunderstanding (p. 170). This clarification does not help much, because it does not explain how a divine person can become truly human. This is the third objection. Clementson acknowledges the problem of maintaining a personal continuity between the pre-existent Son and the human Jesus: “If, by personal continuity, we mean continuity of individual conscious existence and memory, then this must surely be rejected as interference in his ordinary humanity and, in modern terms, physiologically impossible” (p. 171). Clementson thus proposes an alternative understanding of the incarnation, “not the continuity of an individual being, but the embodiment in a new human individual of the parent-child relationship eternally present in the Godhead” (p. 171). Before evaluating this understanding of the incarnation it is important describe Clementson’s view of personhood.
Personhood
The Trinity is traditionally defined as three persons (Gk: hypostasis) in one substance (Gk: ousia). It is Clementson’s proposition that this language is of little value for discussion with Christadelphians because the term ‘person’ is open to misunderstanding (p. 174). ‘Person’ in modern usage carries the connotation of a distinct individual being; Clementson acknowledges “on these terms, God is clearly one person, not three” (p. 175). He proposes, therefore, that what the church fathers expressed in hypostasis could be expressed to modern ears as “distinguishable centres of personhood” (p. 175) and as “relational qualities” (p. 171).
It is not entirely clear what is being expressed in these terms. Are these “centres of personhood” conceived of separate and distinct minds, or as aspects of the same mind? Are they self-conscious identities, or clusters of qualities? Clementson has already rejected the idea that the Son had an individual consciousness continuous from his divine state to his incarnation, proposing instead that Jesus was a new individual that embodied pre-existing relational qualities. This tends towards the concept that Father, Son and Spirit are not self-conscious minds but clusters of qualities. Such a doctrine would seem to tend towards a form of modalism, which is generally regarded as heresy.
Moreover, it seems to create numerous inconsistencies with common Trinitarian belief and practice. For instance, contrary to common evangelical dogma, Jesus apparently did not have a conscious pre-existence prior to his birth, at least not in any conventional sense, but his consciousness was created at his birth to include a cluster of qualities. Does this consciousness continue to exist? Clementson is unclear on this point. He insists that the human Jesus did not cease to exist and he ascended to the Godhead with his humanity “intact” (p. 172). Does this mean that there are now two consciousnesses within the Godhead, or has the Jesus-consciousness been subsumed into the consciousness of God? Furthermore, if the Trinity is not three consciousnesses but three clusters of qualities then in what sense is it meaningful to worship or pray to the Father, the Son and the Spirit? How can one have a personal relationship with a cluster of qualities? Surely, if God is a single conscious being then one can only have a relationship with God as unity. Such a tendency would seem to make the concept of the Trinity meaningless.
Despite the noble intention of the author of attempting to identify the right language for discussion with Christadelphians, it seems to me, at least, that he has failed. Neither hypostasis nor “distinguishable centres of personhood” are Biblical expressions for talking about the Father, the Son or the Spirit, and so are unlikely to appeal to Christadelphians.
Divine Identity
With regards to positive reasons for identifying Jesus as God (or the incarnation of a cluster of divine qualities, if you prefer), Clementson presents three. The first is R. Bauckham’s concept of divine identity as presented in God Crucified (p. 167).[8] Bauckham asserts that Second Temple Judaism was “characterized by a ‘strict’ monotheism that made it impossible to attribute real divinity to any figure other than the one God”,[9] thus any ascription of divine qualities to Jesus by the New Testament writers should be interpreted as including Jesus in “the unique divine identity as Jewish monotheism understood it”.[10] Instances of Jesus sharing God’s throne, having sovereignty over all things, being given the divine name, and being worshipped (see below) should, according to Bauckham, be taken as including Jesus in the divine identity.
The flaw in Bauckham’s argument is the assertion of a strict monotheism in Second Temple Judaism. In reality the strict monotheism of Rabbinic Judaism that precludes “semi-divine” beings arose as a response to Christianity, and was not characteristic of Second Temple Judaism, which was heterogeneous. I have argued elsewhere,
Jews of Jesus’ day did not operate under a two-category system … but a multi-categorical system with God at its head. Nothing preached by Jesus or the early apostles implied that Jesus belonged in the God-category.[11]
In any case, in the NT believers are promised to sit on the divine throne (Rev 3:21), to have sovereignty over the nations (Rev 2:26), to bear the divine name (Rev 3:12), and to be worshipped (proskuneo; Rev 3:9). This argument fails to do justice to explicit statements in the NT that distinguish Jesus from the unique divine identity, that is from the one God (1 Cor 8:6; 1 Tim 2: 5; John 17:3; Jude 1:4; Eph 4:5-6).
Worship of Jesus
Clementson gives special emphasis to the worship of Jesus. He recognizes two ways in which Jesus may be worshipped, either because God specifically commands it or of one who is within the Godhead. The former alternative, which he identifies as the Christadelphian position, Clementson describes as coming “dangerously close to the polytheism that Christadelphians claim to reject” (p. 171). It is only the latter alternative that can be properly exercised within monotheism and thus is the only alternative that can explain the worship of Jesus by early Christians (p. 172).
The assumption that underpins this argument is that all worship is of the same sort and thus any form of worship carries with it an implicit recognition of divinity. This is simply not the case. The word used in the NT to describe the worship of Jesus is proskuneo, which can be used both of the worship of God and the reverence of worthy men (cf. Matt 18:26; Rev 3:9). An act of proskuneo implies only respect and honour, not the worship of a deity. The word used for the exclusive worship of God is sebomai and its cognates (cf. Rom 1:25). This is not applied to Jesus in the NT.[12]
Jesus and the Spirit
The third reason Clementson gives for identifying Jesus with God is his privilege of outpouring the Holy Spirit. Acts 2 records that Jesus poured out the Holy Spirit on the disciples. “But”, Clementson reasons, “in Old Testament terms, the Spirit is not an independent power, but part of God’s own identity; there is no place for the Spirit being owned or controlled by anyone other than God”. Thus the outpouring of the Spirit by Jesus signifies that he is God. This, he says, is “perhaps the strongest argument of all for placing the exalted Jesus within the Godhead” (p. 169).
Clementson anticipates the Christadelphian response, that God granted Jesus control of this power. However, in fairness, it is not a Christadelphian argument at all but ad verbim quotation from the text:
Therefore being exalted to the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he poured out this which you now see and hear (Acts 2:33 [NKJV])
One can hardly argue that Jesus was not given the Holy Spirit when the text itself states that he received it. Also, since there are ample references to the Holy Spirit being given and received by believers in the NT (John 7:39; Acts 8:15-9, 10:47, 19:6), it seems impossible to argue that one should need to be God to do either. Clementson baldy asserts that the Holy Spirit in the OT is part of God’s identity without citing any biblical text or any scholarly authority.[13] Yet elsewhere in his article he acknowledges that the Holy Spirit in the OT “can be understood simply as God’s power” (p. 172).
Holy Spirit
Clementson’s comments regarding the Holy Spirit are somewhat reserved. He acknowledges that the Spirit can be understood as the power of God and that personification of the Spirit in the NT is not sufficient evidence of real personhood (p. 172). He even goes so far as state that if the Son is not regarded as being in the Godhead then “it is sufficient to discuss the relationship between the Father and the Spirit in terms of a person and his power” (p. 174). His argument for the “distinct identity” or “personhood” of the Spirit is taken from those NT passages that speak of the Spirit of Jesus (citing Rom 8:9; Gal 4:6; Phil 1:19): “we are forced to consider that the Spirit must in some sense be distinguishable from both Father and Son in order to be sent by either” (p. 173).
This argument fails to establish the personhood of the Spirit. If I project my voice from one room to another I can claim a certain independence for my voice (it can be in one room while I am in another); this does not mean my voice has personhood distinct from my own. That God can send his Spirit signifies some level of independence but not personhood. Further that the Spirit is often sent, but never sends itself, would seem to deny personhood. Those passages which speak of the spirit of Jesus deserve further evaluation since it is far from clear that the spirit of Jesus is the Holy Spirit.
Threefold Experience of God
Clementson avers, “The ultimate test of orthodoxy is not adherence to the ancient creeds but a faith that naturally expresses itself in the same way as the New Testament” (p. 175). Clementson believes that this natural expression is the threefold experience of God, which he claims the first believers knew. For all this, he can only provide two NT expressions of the threefold experience of God, each of which betrays his purpose: i) 2 Cor 13:14 speaks not of three divine persons but one “God”, one “Lord Jesus” and the Holy Spirit. This does not appear to be a threefold experience of God, but a singular experience of God, accompanied by his Son and his power. Comparison with the close of Paul’s other letters demonstrates that he did not experience God in Trinity; his usual benediction is “the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you” (Rom 16:24; 1 Cor 16:23; Phil 4:23; 1 Thess 5:28; 2 Thess 3:18; cf. Gal 6:18); and ii) the baptismal formula of Matt 28:19 also does not speak of three divine persons, but is rather an early form of baptismal confession centred on a shared name.[14] This threefold formula must be contrasted with the early Christian practice of baptizing “in the name of Jesus Christ” (Acts 2:38, 8:16, 10:48, and 19:5).
Conclusion
In conclusion we can say that while Clementson has tried to be sympathetic to Christadelphians, his logic and arguments break down. The Christadelphian understanding and experience of God is based upon the Bible. There they encounter one God, the Son of God and the power of God.
[1] J. Clementson, “The Christadelphians and the Doctrine of the Trinity” Evangelical Quarterly 75.2 (2003): 157-176.
[2] Clementson, “The Christadelphians”, 157-163.
[3] See the statements on the websites www.eauk.org, www.ifesworld.org and www.theevangelicalchurch.org [cited 15/01/10].
[4] Clementson, “The Christadelphians”, 168, 170-1, 175.
[5] J. D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making (2nd ed.; London SCM Press, 1989), 113-121.
[6] N. T. Wright, ‘Adam in Pauline Christology’, SBL Seminar Papers 22 (1983): 373-84.
[7] T. E. Gaston, ‘Wisdom and the Goddess’, Christadelphian Ejournal of Biblical Interpretation, 2:1 (2008): 53-60.
[8] R. Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in New Testament (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998). [Ed. AP: Bauckham is aware of Christadelphian views, via personal conversations with me when he was at Manchester University and through his reading of A. Eyre, The Protestors (Birmingham: CMPA, 1976).]
[9] Bauckham, God Crucified, 2.
[10] Bauckham, God Crucified, 26.
[11] T. E. Gaston, Proto-Trinity: The Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity in the First and Second Christian Centuries (MPhil diss., University of Birmingham, 2008), 67.
[12] T. E. Gaston, “Worship of Jesus” Christadelphian Ejournal of Biblical Interpretation 3:2 (2009): 69-72.
[13] [Ed. AP: This is also the principal argument of M. M. B. Turner (London School of Theology Professor), “Towards Trinitarian Pneumatology – Perspectives from Pentecost” in his The Holy Spirit and Spiritual Gifts: Then and Now (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996), 166-176.]
[14] Cf. U. Luz, Matthew 21-28: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2003) 632.
The Sabbath and Israel and Jesus’ work on the Sabbath