Right from the first century the Christian Church has always looked upon marriage as being “indissoluble”. At an early date the primitive Church took the step of applying this principle to the pagan world, assuming that there also, any marriage contract was an ordinance intended to bind one man to one woman, to the exclusion of all others, during the lifetime of them both. Thus, if a married heathen or Jewish couple presented themselves together for baptism, no new marriage vows were required between them. This teaching confirmed the universal rule established by the Lord Jesus that marriage is binding and for life (See MATT. 19:1-6).
On the other hand, if a heathen couple had been divorced by secular authority, and contracted second alliances with new partners, they were not, on entry into the Church, permitted to cohabit with these second partners after baptism. So Augustine wrote that “Baptism was refused to men who had put away their wives and married others (whom they refused to give up) and to women who had put away their husbands and married others; since our Lord beyond all doubt testifies such (second) unions be not marriages but adulteries”. This viewpoint was based upon Old Testament precedence of the Israelites being commanded to put away gentile wives. (See EZRA 10:10-12).
Even if we are doubtful of the applicability of Augustine’s interpretation of Ezra 10, these facts are of great importance, since they prove how tenaciously the early Church held to the rule of indissolubility as a necessary condition of true marriage.
This fundamental truth was, however, apparently crossed by a New Testament injunction commonly called the “Pauline privilege”, which is commonly taken to mean that divorce is permissible by the ‘believing’ partner if his or her ‘unbelieving’ partner ‘departs’. (See 1 COR. 7:15). Here we note that the “privilege” does not apply where both partners are in the faith. Whatever the words mean, they only apply where one of the partners is not in the faith, and furthermore, the conditions in question go back to that laid down by Paul, that the heathen partner must be “unwilling to abide” with the Christian partner. Thus, the believing partner in the marriage could not “put away” the unbelieving mate.
What exactly constituted unwillingness gave rise to dispute and contention, but the primitive Church held that marriage was so permanent and sacred that the interpretation of the Pauline privilege, held by some as a permission to marry a second time, was rejected; and it was only recognised as a permission to separate from the heathen partner alone without the right of remarriage during his or her lifetime.
The doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage was a new concept in the world into which Christianity brought it. Despite the protests of the Jewish prophets, “the Lord hateth putting away” (see MAL. 2:16), it was the accepted view, among all but the strictest sects of the Jews, that a man could divorce his wife and marry another for grounds of varying degrees: “if she let the broth burn”; “if he found a woman more beautiful”, etc. In the Roman world even laxer customs prevailed. Either partner might divorce the other on the slightest pretext and marry again; the law intervening only to regulate the practice, and to ensure that no grave injustice was done in the distribution of the dowry and the estate.
Under the Mosaic Law, however, divorce was permitted under certain prescribed circumstances; what the Old Testament describes as “uncleanness” (See DEUT. 24:1-4). What the “uncleanness” was no one can be quite sure, but that it was not adultery was quite certain, since under the Law, those found guilty of that sin were put to death.
However, the new Christian doctrine, in respect to the binding nature of marriage, ran counter to the whole tenor of contemporary practice, and apparently the system was too rigorous for those in the Church to endure. By the beginning of the third century there is evidence that women, who had for one reason or another left their first partners, were marrying others during the lifetime of their original husbands. Origen wrote that not only were women who had secured a divorce remarrying, but some of the rulers of the medieval Church were sanctioning the practice.
A century later the matter had become so serious that canons and councils were legislating against it (Elvira A.D. 306, Arles A.D. 314, etc.); and with the great invasion of the Church by the semi-heathen world, which was the inevitable sequel of the conversion of Constantine, it became evident that the existing ecclesiastical practice in the matter was too severe to be retained in all its original integrity.
By the fourth century the yoke of Christian marriage was proving too heavy for the semi-converted masses. It was not merely that men and women wanted release from partners whose infidelity exhausted their patience, they also wished to be released from the first partner in order to unite themselves to a second. Hence, mere separation allowed to an ‘innocent’ husband or wife whose partner had been guilty of marital infidelity, was not itself enough. Reluctantly the medieval Church made concessions for the rebellious sex instincts of her members.
The husband was the first to receive this concession. Basil, who wrote in A.D. 374,was in the unenviable position that he dare not oppose the custom of contemporary Christianity, which allowed remarriage to a husband who had divorced his wife for adultery. His contemporary, Epiphanius of Salamis, allowed the innocent wife the same privilege as the innocent husband. The process went on until, after the succession of Justinian at the beginning of the sixth century, the relaxed attitude towards divorce assumed the shape it continues to have today.
Thus, it became established in the orthodox Church that divorce and remarriage were permitted on the grounds of adultery. When the Church became part of the State at the time of Henry VIII and canon law became part of English Law, divorce was allowed for adultery, and other things such as desertion, cruelty, etc.
In support of divorce and remarriage, on the grounds of adultery, an appeal is made in vindication of this to what is called the “exceptive clause”, which is quoted twice in Matthew’s gospel, and which is commonly believed to teach that divorce is permissible if one partner to a marriage has been found guilty of committing this sin. (See MATT. 5:32, 19:8-9.)
Matthew, when he wrote his gospel, was (from the human point of view) probably aware of at least two other accounts of Christ’s sayings about marriage and divorce, as recorded by the other gospel writers. In Luke’s gospel the teaching is quite explicit, (see LUKE 16:18), and there is an extended version of this injunction in Mark’s gospel, (see MARK 10:2-12), and both accounts do not have an “exceptive clause” and are quite explicit in stating: “Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery”.
As the text stands in Matthew 5:32, the words “saving for the cause of fornication” follow the words “put away his wife”. The purpose of this exceptive clause is difficult to see, since apparently it in no way mitigates the teaching of the passage that even an innocent wife, if divorced, cannot remarry without being guilty of adultery; and it says nothing at all as to the right of a man to remarry, for whatever reason he may have divorced his wife.
There are at least three possible explanations:
- The clause is an interpolation and was not in the original text. To be quite fair, however, there is no genuine manuscript evidence extant for adopting this point of view.
- The “exceptive clause” may not refer to “marriage” at all, but to the Jewish custom of “betrothal”, and that if, during the “engagement”, a man found that his bride-to-be had sexually misbehaved, he could put her away; in the same way that Joseph determined to “put away” Mary, before his mind was enlightened by the angel Gabriel, as to the true cause of her condition.
- The customary word for a married woman’s infidelity is “moicheia”, but the word used for grounds of divorce in Matthew is “porneia”. Therefore, the Lord might not be speaking of adultery but of pre-marital unchastity. If this is so, the so-called exceptive clause would seem to be saying that the wife may be dismissed by reason of unchastity before marriage and not after marriage. That Scripture seems to make a distinct difference between “fornication” and “adultery” is seen from Mark’s gospel. (See MARK 7:21 and also JOHN 8:41.)
Whether however “fornication” as used in Matthew’s gospel is limited to meaning sexual intercourse between unmarried persons or includes “adultery” which means sexual intercourse between two parties where one or both are married, the question must be asked —”Is the writer speaking of ‘separation’ or `divorce’ which entails taking one’s partner in marriage through the Law Courts, which action is forbidden in Scripture?” (See 1 COR 6:1). Whatever the conclusion, that remarriage, after separation or divorce, is not apparently permissible, is confirmed elsewhere by Paul in his writings. (See 1 COR. 7:10-11, ROM. 7:2-3.)
It is sometimes urged in defence of (or as an excuse for) the remarriage of the believer whose partner has been divorced for adultery that “adultery destroys the marriage bond”. To this statement four questions should perhaps be asked:
- Why should this power of dissolving a marriage be automatically attributed to marital infidelity and be withheld from sins in every degree as flagrant, such as persistent cruelty or desertion? An isolated act of infidelity may be the result of a momentary passion or loss of self-control, but cruelty and desertion are conscious and deliberate.
- If adultery does destroy the marriage bond, at what point does it do so? At the moment it is committed, at the moment when it is discovered by the innocent party, or at the moment when it is established in a civil court of Law? It seems that the first possibility is unlikely since this would mean that the world would be full of innumerable marriages that were not marriages at all. Further, it would mean that all children born to the couple after that act of adultery had been committed, were ipso facto illegitimate. Nor is the second possibility likely, since society would not allow an innocent husband or wife to separate from a partner and marry someone else, on the grounds of being personally convinced that adultery had been committed.
- In God’s sight, adultery is not just the physical act, but also unlawful sexual desire in the heart, of which sin all men are guilty. (See MATT. 5:27.)
- The nation of Israel committed “adultery” yet the Lord God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob took her back as His Bride, so why should a believer whose wife has been guilty of this sin behave any differently from the Lord God Almighty?
It seems then that what must be meant by the statement: “adultery destroys marriage” is the very different statement: “adultery makes the marriage void if the injured party chooses to bring an action for divorce”. Even so, we have not escaped from the inconvenient question: “why should this be asserted of adultery only and not other causes, such as cruelty, neglect, desertion, drunkenness, confirmed criminality, drug taking and insanity?”
However, the essential difficulty for which divorce is demanded as a remedy, is not the adultery, cruelty or desertion by which the guilty party trespasses against the innocent party. For such difficulties separation would be sufficient. The true difficulty begins only when the so-called innocent partner meets someone else whom he or she desires to marry. Thus, the fact remains that the innocent partner can only think of marriage with this third person as possible, if he or she is prepared to disown the original obligation of life-long allegiance.
What seems to be needed, therefore, is a clear recognition that an ecclesia shall have the right to require of its members conformity to the principle of the indissolubility of marriage as being a condition of fellowship; and if there is a refusal to comply then the benefits of fellowship should be withdrawn. It may be said that to refuse fellowship to anyone on these grounds is to usurp the prerogative of God. But if this is so, it would seem that anyone who maintains that an ecclesia has no right to exercise discipline over its members, has never really thought out the implications of his position.
But the question of the nature of the discipline to be exercised in the case of the remarriage of divorced ecclesial members is a perplexing one. The most obvious view is that no concession whatever should be made to the hardness of men’s hearts, and that any ecclesial member who remarried during the lifetime of the first partner, whether after securing a divorce or being divorced, should be refused fellowship until such time as he or she separated from this second partner.
If we accept the conclusion previously reached, that as a matter of historic fact the Lord Jesus forbade remarriage after divorce in any circumstances, this would at first sight seem to make the suggested course of action inevitable. However, the conclusion does not necessarily follow, for, emphatic and unequivocal though Christ’s words appear to be, they do not prescribe any specific course of action by which it is to be enforced, if a member carries through a divorce action and marries a second partner.
There is, therefore, the view that has to be considered, that some concession ought to be granted. The compromise usually suggested is that the so-called innocent, or the so-called repentant guilty partner to a divorce suit should be allowed to remarry without forfeiting his or her right to fellowship. Compromise, however, on a point of principle is always a dangerous expedient; it can only be justified as the lesser of two evils; and if we believe that the Lord Jesus forbade remarriage after divorce in every case, we will hesitate long before embracing the side of concession. Even if we ultimately decide that it is the lesser of the two evils involved, the conclusion will be a very bitter one indeed. Nevertheless, though it be a conclusion from which we all shrink, we must recognise that the arguments against the other alternative, the course of “no compromise”, are weighty, too.
There is first, the argument from ecclesiastical history. The vast majority of Christian bodies appear to have been compelled, sooner or later, to provide some loophole for the pent-up instincts which rebelled against the rule of indissoluble marriage. We may deplore the fact, but it remains a fact nevertheless. Even the Lord Jesus Himself declared “All men cannot receive this saying (the ideal of indissoluble marriage), save they to whom it is sent”. (See MATT. 19:11.)
Second, there is the argument from Christadelphian experience that a cast-iron discipline is almost inevitably bound to over-reach itself. Either it produces hypocrisy and evasion, or else the fellowship which exercises it shrinks gradually to the dimensions of a mere handful of believers, whose influence upon the world in the preaching and furtherance of the gospel is negligible.
Third, if we elect for the way of “no compromise”, we may be saying that the parties to a divorce suit have committed an “unforgivable sin”, which cannot be so, since the only “unforgivable sin” is that of attributing the holy works of Christ to the Devil (See MARK 3:28-29.)
Assuming, however, that it is decided that the interests of the Gospel necessitate some compromise to human frailty, it still remains to consider what form that concession should take. It appears that the right course of action to follow is to insist that the one who has violated the standard of “indissoluble marriage” should be removed from holding any ecclesial office. If this were done, a principle of the first importance would have been established, the principle that no one should be allowed any official voice or part (however small) in the organisation, administration or supervision of the ecclesia, who has offended against the essential teaching of the Lord Jesus about marriage. If such a rule were adopted, the ecclesia could insist that it was giving practical effect to the profession of holding to this cardinal tenet of faith. What is thus suggested is not a double standard of conduct, that dangerous expedient which so often led the medieval Church into difficulties, but a double standard of discipline, based upon a clear demarcation between those who accept, or desire, official responsibility, and those who do not desire to have it.
What is needed is the conscience of all ecclesias being alerted to the folly of electing anyone to office who, in actual practice, has broken the principle of indissoluble marriage to which the ecclesia of God is bound to witness, a principle established by Timothy when he wrote that: “a bishop must be blameless, the husband of one wife… ” (1 TIM. 3:2), and “moreover he must have a good report of them which are without” (1 TIM. 3:7). It is clear from these verses that men had come into the Faith who had been divorced and remarried, and who were not apparently commanded to ‘put away’ their `second partners’. Nonetheless, as a consequence of their invidious position, they were disqualified from holding the status of an Elder, since no accusation must be allowed to be pointed at one holding ‘holy office’ in the Church of God.
On the point of principle there is no open question. Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition alike agree that marriage is the indissoluble union of one man to one woman, so long as they both shall live; and that no other form of sex-union is in accordance with the will of God; but from a practical point of view, when cases of divorce and remarriage occur in our own community, each case must be treated on its merit and looked at individually as to its particular circumstances; after the parties involved acknowledge that they have violated the cardinal principle of indissoluble marriage.
A parallel situation seems to exist with that of “marriage outside the Truth”. When a member marries someone outside the Faith, after withdrawal of fellowship, they normally write a letter to the ecclesia acknowledging their error and expressing deep regret. However, we may personally view such a situation, what the person concerned, in effect, is doing, is to acknowledge the principle of “marriage only in the Lord”, and to express regret that they cannot achieve this ideal. On such a confession we receive the person concerned back into fellowship.
Finally, let there be no doubt about it, divorce and re-marriage are disastrous. Such action splits ecclesias down the middle; shatters the faith of individual brothers and sisters who have hitherto looked up to those who have fallen into this grievous sin; causes those who are looking into the things of God to turn aside; makes for incalculable harm to the children of such broken marriages, and, worst of all, brings the Name of Christ into disrepute.
Divorce and remarriage is not simply the putting away of a partner with whom we have fallen out of love, it is the putting away of someone who belongs to Christ. It is the breaking up of a union, which in miniature, is the Kingdom of God. It is the spurning of the betrothal of Christ and his Bride.
Christ’s life was spent in giving, not getting. He sacrificed his own personal life for his Bride, and we are called upon to express the same kind of unselfishness and love to our partner in marriage. Thus, where one of the partners is determined to live according to Scripture, the marriage will rarely end in divorce; and if a truly innocent person has to bear the burden of an unhappy marriage, there is hope for that partner, even in suffering. It may be that the purpose of God for some of us is to endure hardship in marriage, but the loss of temporal happiness will be more than compensated by eternal gain, in the Kingdom of God.
The Parables of Jesus – (Part 6) – The Wedding Banquet