Philippians 2:5-11: Divine Identity through Manifestation

Introduction

Philippians 2:5-11 is a well-known passage for ‘establishing’ the pre-existence and/or the deity of Christ. It has been the subject of extensive commentary by Christian scholars and for non-Trinitarians it has been viewed as a ‘problem passage’.[1] It shouldn’t be viewed as such, but it is recognised as presenting a set of exegetical puzzles for all commentators. It can even lay claim to the most talked about word in the New Testament— a`rpagmo,j (KJV, ‘robbery’) In this article, our dialogue partners are N. T. Wright and J. D. G. Dunn.[2] Wright is the best place to start today if you want to get an introduction into the secondary literature and have a modern consensus[3] reading to evaluate.

This paper is divided into three sections: (A) Exegesis; (B) Philology; and (C) Concluding Remarks. There is some philology in (A) but we have placed the major technical discussion of philology in (B) because there has been great disagreement over a`rpagmo,j. In this way, we have presented our exegesis in (A) in a more straightforward fashion, leaving much of the nuts and bolts of philological disagreement to (B).

(A) Exegesis

Method

Where do the difficulties in Phil 2:5-11 lie? They lie in the subtle interweave of typological allusions in the passage. By ‘subtle interweave’ we mean that individual words carry allusions to different parts of the Hebrew Scriptures and recognising these is the essential first step to explaining the passage (1 Cor 2:13).[4] If we overlook or miss an allusion for word ‘A’ we may end up using the allusion in another word ‘B’ to guide our interpretation of word ‘A’ and get things wrong.

Some approach the passage with the prejudice that Christ did not pre-exist; other commentators have the opposite prejudice. We need to be aware of these prejudices because of their influence on interpretation. Our point is not that one prejudice is right and the other is wrong, nor are we saying that using interpretative keys is wrong; our point is simply that we need to be aware of what we bring to the passage as we set out its intertextuality.

So, our method of approach to the passage is purely intertextual, using the Hebrew Scriptures; the objective is to trace the allusions and thereby uncover the typological basis of the passage. Since there are plenty of monographs and articles ‘out there’ on the passage, this paper will only have a point if it puts forward a new nuanced typological interpretation, using and recombining some existing ideas, and this is our objective.

Form of God and form of servant

Translation issues exist for vv. 6-8 which we need to discuss as we go along. Many translations have something like the following for these verses:

Who, being (u`pa,rcwn) in the form (morfh/|) of God, did not consider (h`gh,sato) equal­ity with God (to. ei=nai i=sa qew/|) something to be grasped (a`rpagmo.n), but made himself of no reputa­tion (evke,nwsen), and took upon him the form (morfh.n) of a servant, being made in the likeness of men (evn o`moiw,mati avnqrw,pwn geno,menoj). And being found in fashion as a man (kai. sch,mati eu`reqei.j w`j a;nqrwpoj), he humbled himself (evtapei,nwsen e`auto,n), and became obedient to death, even the death of the cross. Phil 2:6-8

I roughly follow the RSV in this translation and our goal is to show where it is right and where it is wrong. The translation of the passage from GNT in any number of versions can mislead a reader. Taking the first clause, the NASB has ‘although he existed in the form of God’ and the RSV has ‘though he was in the form of God’. The NIV has ‘being in very nature God’ (echoing the Nicene Creed with its use of ‘very’); the NEB has ‘for the divine nature was his from the first’. We can be certain that ‘being in the form of God’ (KJV) is correct for u`pa,rcwn, because this present participle form of the Greek verb is typically used to introduce a state (e.g. Rom 4:19; 1 Cor 11:7; 2 Cor 8:17; 2 Cor 12:16; Gal 1:14; 2;14[5]) and the English participle form ‘being’ naturally represents the Greek participle and a state. Use of ‘to exist’ explicitly brings existence into the text, but this is to impose the theology of the translator; use of the past tense ‘was’ might direct the reader to think of a past time when Christ was in the form of God; hence, the present participle, ‘being’ is to be preferred. The participle is not about time but about describing the condition for when Christ Jesus considered equality. If we want to think about timing, then the use of the title ‘Christ Jesus’ tells the reader that this consideration happened in Christ’s life.[6]

The choice of ‘form of God’ is also correct as morfh, is about outward appearance (Mk 16:12; LXX Jud 8:18;[7] Job 4:16; Isa 44:13; Dan 3:19). The word is all about what can be seen and it is not about ‘nature’; it is astonishing that the translation committees of the NIV and NEB could be so cavalier with linguistics in favour of theological bias.[8] If Paul had been thinking of ‘nature’, he would have used fu,sij,[9] perhaps making the contrast in v. 7, avlla.  fu,sei (cf. Rom 2:14; Gal 2:15; 4:8; Eph 2:3). The use of morfh, in the NT and LXX should steer an impartial commentator away from ideas of essential nature. It is useful to compare Josephus’ use of the word morfh, in Pharaoh’s daughter’s speech about the child Moses,

I have brought up a child who is of a divine form (morfh/| te qei/on), and of a generous mind; and as I have received him from the bounty of the river, in a wonderful manner, I thought proper to adopt him my son, and the heir of your kingdom. Ant. 2:232

Josephus uses the normal Greek adjective for ‘divine’ (qei/oj), which incidentally is nowhere used of Christ in the NT, and speaks of the physical appearance of Moses as of divine form. Another example: Josephus says of Gideon,

At this time a spectre appeared to him in the shape (morfh/|) of a young man, and told him that he was a happy man, and beloved of God. Ant. 5:213

What something looks like is central to this usage of (morfh,) but this word is not necessarily about physical looks. It can be used how a person behaves and their demeanour. Philo has an interesting use of morfh,,

Let him cease, then, this pretended Apollo, from imitating that real healer of mankind, for the form of God (qeou/ morfh.) is not a thing which is capable of being imitated by an inferior one, as good money is imitated by bad. (Gai 1:110)

Philo denies the possibility of imitating the form of God; only God can have this form. We might think that Paul is saying Jesus is God, but he is actually saying something opposite, for he is saying that something inferior, a man (Christ Jesus, v. 5), had the form of God, but following Philo’s usage, this is saying that we can see in Christ’s manner, demeanour and behaviour—God.

What the biblical and non-biblical examples show is that ‘form’ has to do with what is seen. Intertextually, in the New Testament, what we should search for are texts that are about what could be seen in Christ and this suggests that ‘form of God’ is about God-manifestation[10] and not incarnation; the church fathers simply got it wrong, using as they did the Greek philosophy of their day as their tool of understanding.

Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou then, Shew us the Father? John 14:9 (KJV)

Hence, N. Mullen concludes, “New Testament evidence, then, suggests that morphe refers to that which is manifest for seeing.”[11] The presumption required by v. 5 is that ‘being in the form of God’ means that people could ‘see’ God in Christ Jesus. That is, the example of Christ Paul is advocating is his human example, not the example of a pre-existent being.

It is useful at this point to observe that Paul is not describing Christ as the image of God (Gen 1:26-27). He is not making the same point as that which he makes in Colossians 1, where he states that Christ is the image (eivkw.n)[12] of the invisible God, which takes us directly back to Genesis. Commentators often make the connection, but had Paul wanted to convey the idea and allusions of ‘image of God’, he would have chosen eivkw.n (cf. 1 Cor 11:7).[13]

The phrase ‘form of God’ is unique for NT writings and we might just suppose that Paul is using a commonly understood Greek expression of his day,[14] and that he just happens to be the only NT writer to use the phrase. However, because Phil 2:5-11 has such a dense intertextual weave, it is more likely that Paul is in fact using ‘form of God’ because he is using ‘form of servant’ and constructing this expression from Isaiah’s Servant discourses (Isa 52:13-53:12); we can be reasonably certain that Paul’s choice of phrasing is no happenstance.[15]

…his appearance was so marred, beyond human semblance (harm), and his form (rat) beyond that of the sons of men…For he grew up before him like a young plant, and like a root out of dry ground; he had no form (rat) or comeliness that we should look at him, and no beauty (harm) that we should desire him. Isa 52:14-53:2 (RSV)

T. J. Barling, notes that ‘form of God’ and ‘form of servant’ do “balance one another” but he mistakenly interprets the idea behind ‘form of God’ as one of ‘divine status’.[16] His argument is that since Jesus had the status of a servant so too he must have had divine status. The reasoning is inadequate, for as we have seen, morfh/| is about appearance and what can be seen about a person, and Paul does not use the common Greek word for ‘divine’ (qei/oj). An intertextual method leads to the conclusion that ‘form of God’ is about demeanour, character, and behaviour.

The Jerusalemites[17] had initially seen[18] no ‘form or comeliness’ in the Servant of the Lord originally, but now his ‘form’ was also marred (Isa 52:13-14; 53:2). Nevertheless, he would be ‘high’ and ‘exalted’ (Isa 52:13) and this exaltation is also picked up by Paul when he comments about Jesus, “…therefore God has highly exalted him” (Phil 2:9).[19] Jesus’ exaltation follows on from his obedience and it is this quality of obedience that defines what Paul means by ‘form of a servant’.

The background to Philippians 2 is sometimes taken to be just the Genesis creation.[20] However, this is only one context and another background is that of Isaiah. Philippians 2 compares Christ and the Servant. Exactly what Paul is using in Isaiah is open for discussion. He could be using harm which is related to the ordinary Hebrew for ‘seeing’ (with Mullen), or he could be using rat which is in a poetic parallelism with harm. In either case, he is not relating ‘form of a servant’ to what Adam became after the Fall (he was given that job before the Fall).[21]

Pre-existence

Commentators often propose that Paul presumes pre-existence for Christ in the phrase, ‘being in the form of God’. Within a modern Christian frame of reference, the text says that Christ was in the form of God, but that he emptied himself and took upon himself the form of a servant, which amounted to being made into the likeness of men; and being a man he submitted to death. This seems to speak of the Son taking decisions about human nature, and it therefore seems to imply that he must have pre-existed in some way in order to make these decisions and the text is about incarnation.

Our argument against this has been:

1. The expression ‘being in the form of God’ uses a Greek present participle which means that Christ was in the form of God when he considered equality. The Greek construc­tion does not suggest that Christ was once in the form of God, and then at some later point considered equality. Within a Jewish monotheistic frame of reference, the two opening clauses clearly distinguish Christ from God, through their use of ‘form of God’ (morfh/| qeou/) and ‘with God’ (qew/|[/hb]).
2. Paul is describing an attitude of Christ Jesus when he was on the earth. The use of the title ‘Christ Jesus’ in v. 5 establishes the timing of the thoughts about equality. Paul is not describing the state of mind of a heavenly being, and God the Son was not Christ Jesus prior to the incarnation. Why would a heavenly being, or even God the Son, think about equality with God the Father, and why would the thoughts of the Son in such a state be an example for us? The force of Paul’s point lies in the fact that Christ displayed humility as one of us.
3. The example of Christ is all about what could be seen in his demeanour, character and behaviour; this is the point in using morfh,. Paul will go on and describe what could be seen in Christ’s behaviour in his trial and death (v. 8). It is in these choices and behaviour that we see Christ’s thinking about equality – this is why it is an example for us. Contrawise, there is no example for us in such a thought motivating a pre-existent Son to become incarnate.

We have cited texts showing that ‘morphe refers to that which is manifest for seeing’. Commentators often paraphrase ‘form of God’ but it is important for our case that we read nothing more in the phrase than what could be seen in Christ’s life. For instance, it might be proposed that Christ thought he had divine ‘status’ or that that he had the ‘role’ of God because he took upon himself the status or role of a servant. The problem with this line of exegesis is that it treats ‘servant’ generically. Such a reading is precluded by the quotation of ‘form’ from Isa 52:13/53:2. The ‘form’ of the servant in Isaiah was marred ([hb]txvm[/hb]) and it is this form of this servant that Christ took upon himself in his trial and crucifixion. The paraphrase of ‘status/role’ doesn’t reflect the specifics of the allusion; Christ took upon himself the form of that servant. Christ did not take on the role of a servant of men per se, although he was at times their servant (Matt 20:28, John 13:4-5), but he did take on being Yahweh’s Servant.

Thing

It should be clear from our discussion so far that, in the first instance, scholars root the idea of pre-existence in the expression ‘being in the form of God’—but this is a mistake. The next translational issue is the noun [gk]a`rpagmo,j. This is rare in contemporary secular Greek and absent from the LXX; the related verb is common enough. Wright discusses at least ten different readings of this word in context in his book![22]

Christ considered (h`gh,sato) something and the grammar here is simply: verb of cognition + accusative object + accusative articular infinitive. The accusative articular infinitive (to. ei=nai i=sa qew/|) is straightforward enough, but we have to decide what is meant by equality with God. We also have to decide whether Christ thought he already had equality or whether he thought he didn’t have the equality he was considering. Then we have to decide how to translate the noun a`rpagmo,j, whether in terms of a thing or an act. Finally, we have to decide whether to translate with a noun or an active or passive participle phrase.

Most translations opt for variations of ‘something to be grasped’ (e.g. NASB, RSV, NET, NIV); the KJV translates in terms of an ‘act’ – ‘robbery’. The lexicographical exercise is all about gathering examples of usage from other Greek texts and classifying different senses for the word in their contexts. This has been done by various scholars. However, by way of a conclusion, Arndt and Gingrich observe that the translation can only be made on “an understanding of Paul’s thought in general” rather than lexicography.[23] Rather than discuss the lexicography here (see Section B) and align Paul’s usage with one set of uses rather than another, we will first concentrate on Paul’s thought in general.

The reason for concentrating on Paul’s thought in general rather than lexicography is that Paul’s typological reasoning in the passage will supply a basis for choosing among the lexicographical options. The main lexicographical fault-lines among scholars have been, firstly, whether to translate in terms of a thing or an act, and secondly, whether to translate with a noun or an active or passive participle phrase. The choices that have been made have been determined firstly by whether or not Christ already has the equality he is considering. For example, we might choose a verb like ‘seize’ or ‘grasp’ if we think Paul assumes Christ did not have equality (‘something to be grasped’); or we might choose a verbal phrase like ‘hold onto’ or ‘take advantage of’ if we think Paul assumes Christ already had equality. On the other hand, if we think a`rpagmo,j is an act, we might follow the KJV’s ‘robbery’ or go for a less specific act like ‘seizure’. It is then a secondary matter as to whether we think Christ has or hasn’t the equality which he considered as an act.

When we look at the contours of Paul’s typology, the main observation to make is that Paul alludes to Adam. There is a clear set of allusions to Adam in ‘equality=as gods/one of us’ (Gen 3:5, 22) and ‘likeness of men’ (Gen 5:3) as well as the theme of ‘obedience’ and the position of Adam in the story. Adam did not have equality before the Fall. He then had an equality in knowing good and evil, but he did not have an equality in living forever (Gen 3:22). The typological comparison we make between Jesus and Adam depends on the point in the story at which we place Jesus.

The Genesis story has equality in two places. The first is the Serpent’s temptation, ‘you will be like God’ (Gen 3:5), and the second is when God says, “Behold, the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever…” (Gen 3:22). If we place Jesus into the story before the Fall, he has no equality with God and his obedience is an easy contrast with Adam’s disobedience: he did not grasp at equality unlike Adam (cf. Rms 5:19). This is perhaps the most common idea; commentators often make the comparison that Adam grasped at equality by eating the fruit unlike Christ who was obedient unto death.[24]

Comparing Jesus and Adam before the Fall suffers from two fatal problems. The first is that Eve gives the fruit to Adam; there is no grasping or seizing on Adam’s part. The force behind this objection is the lack of an intertextual link centered on the idea of a`rpagmo,j. The second problem is that while Adam was in the image and likeness of God, this is not the typological basis for ‘being in the form of God’ (see above). These two objections support the conclusion that the equality that Christ considered does not have a typological basis in Adam seeking to be like God in knowing good and evil.

The second point in the story where we can compare the equality Christ considered is in the living forever like the ‘us’[25] in the narrative:

Then the Lord God said, ‘Behold, the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever’ — therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he was taken. Gen 3:22-23 (RSV)

The equality here is about living forever,[26] and seeing Christ consider such equality nicely fits the flow of Paul’s argument which is about, instead, being obedient unto death. There is also an intertextual link that explains Paul’s choice of verb in ‘taking (lamba,nw) the form of a servant’ (v. 7). This ‘taking’ is the alternative to what was considered by God when he thought Adam might “put forth his hand and take (xql) also of the tree of life”.

There is a further (and deciding) point to make: v. 22 is actually a consideration about equality—a record of thinking about equality on the part of God. We have no description of such thinking on the part of Adam (it is implied for Eve). The typological basis for Christ thinking about equality therefore is not Adam’s thinking but that of God.

There is, of course, a comparison to be made between Christ’s obedience and Adam’s disobedience. We should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. This contrast is carried by u`ph,kooj (‘obedient’ v. 8) but the substance of each act (obedience and disobedience) is different. Adam ate of the fruit of the tree, but Christ did not consider equality with God a thing to be grasped and was obedient unto death.[27]

In sum, there is an Adam Christology in Phil 2:5-11, but it does not consist in ‘being in the form of God’ and/or ‘did not consider equal­ity with God something to be grasped’. It consists in the fact of Christ’s ‘obedience’ and his ‘being made in the likeness of men’ (and in Adam’s position after the Fall). The language where scholars have read an Adam Christology is, rather, language that negates an angelomorphic Christology[28]—Jesus did not consider equality with the angels something to be grasped.

What are the objections to the above exegesis?

1. Wright supports Dunn in positing a real parallel “between the sin of Adam in Genesis 3 and the grasping at equality with God implied in Philippians 2”.[29] Dunn’s argument is that because Adam had free access to the Tree of Life, he enjoyed immortality, and that therefore the “sole ground for envying God was his dependence on God for his knowledge of good and evil”.[30] However, even if this were the case, we might well ask whether there wasn’t a different ground for envy after the Fall (if we want to make the category of ‘envy’ work).This objection is useful. It illustrates a difference of method in that it doesn’t rely on intertextual allusion to establish where Jesus should be placed in the typology of the Genesis story. It therefore doesn’t establish the parallel, for suppose, prior to the Fall, that there was only one reason for envy, this doesn’t mean that such envy is the contrasting type to Christ not grasping equality. As we have argued, the typological basis for Christ thinking about equality is not Adam but God. It is not Adam’s supposed envy of the knowledge of good and evil, and nor is it, after the Fall, a desire to eat of the Tree of Life.[31]
2. It is often said that an Adam Christology in Philippians 2 requires the reading of a`rpagmo,j as ‘something to be grasped’.[32] This depends on the lexical items to which we tie down the Adam Christology. We have based Adam’s lack of equality in God’s comment that Adam should not take of the Tree of Life, concluding that he was not in possession of immortality. There is no contrast with Adam centred in a`rpagmo,j. Adam does have an equality in his possession of the knowledge of good and evil, and we could try and match this equality to an equality possessed by Christ, for example, ‘divine status’. This doesn’t mean that there is not also an equality that Christ does not possess (immortality), and we have argued that a`rpagmo,j references this equality. The Edenic story gives us two equalities to model typologically. If we choose the first and develop a comparison with Adam, we do require a`rpagmo,j to mean  ‘something to be grasped’, but if we choose the second equality as the typological basis for a`rpagmo,j, there is no obligation to use it as part of an Adamic Christology. The narrator, after all, does not describe Adam’s thinking with regard to the second equality.
3. It might be said that Christ did not just consider a matter; he also refused to grasp/snatch at equality. The question here is whether we can attribute the sense of ‘refusal’ to a`rpagmo,j.[33] We might see a refusal implied in Christ’s act of humility (‘he humbled himself’), but this does not give us licence to characterize a`rpagmo,j in terms of a refusal. In relation to a`rpagmo,j we are not told that Christ considered refusing equality. Commentators can over-interpret a word – they can impose ideas from later clauses onto words.
4. Several scholars have thought that Christ did not possess equality but they have proposed various different ideas for what the equality was that Christ considered. For example, ‘divinity’, ‘lordship’, ‘honour’, ‘rights’ and even just the bare status of ‘equality’.[34] The strongest suggestion here is ‘lordship’, which stems from the work of R. P. Martin, and commentators talk of an equality in lordship, which Christ obtained as a result of his obedience unto death. However, the lordship of Christ is not any comprehensive equality with God; Paul consistently distinguishes ‘one God, the Father, and one Lord, Jesus Christ’ (1 Cor 8:6). Furthermore, the text does not actually equate equality and lordship;[35] this is an interpretation by association. Our counter-argument is that the intertextual and typological link with Genesis is a stronger basis for determining the meaning of a`rpagmo,j.

Act

We have been presenting the view that Christ considered equality not already possessed but something not to be grasped. The focus has been on equality as a thing to be possessed. The question is now whether we should interpret a`rpagmo,j instead in terms of an act. The KJV has “thought it not[36] robbery to be equal with God” but ‘robbery’ is not the only possibility.[37] C. F. D. Moule, suggests ‘act of snatching;’[38] but this can be nuanced by choosing a phrase such as ‘act of seizure’, and we could, if we wanted, drop the phrase in favour of ‘snatching’ or ‘seizure’. This means that Christ thought that an equality with God, one not already possessed,[39] would not be robbery/seizing/snatching.

Mullen comments,

The suffix -mos is found a total of 217 times in the New Testament, as the ending of 52 different words. Of these usages the vast majority are indisputably active in meaning (that is, they refer to an action, like “robbery”) and not passive (referring to something which is acted upon, like “a thing to be grasped”).[40]

Mullen’s analysis is supported by J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan’s breakdown of –ma/-mos noun endings;[41] and Moule likewise distinguishes a`rpagmo,j and a[rpagma[42] for the same reason as Mullen. Lightfoot says, the termination –mos “denotes primarily the process”.[43] If we take into account the cognate verb, a`rpa,zw, we get a range of active meanings to consider for the act such as ‘steal, carry off, drag away, snatch’ (Arndt and Gingrich). If we place to one side the (several centuries) later usage of a`rpagmo,j in the church fathers (when they mostly exegete Philippians 2), and consider only the few instances of secular usage, Moule notes “we would have no reason whatever for imagining a`rpagmo,j to mean anything else” other than the act of snatching.[44] This is a decisive argument and it benefits from (is strengthened by) just looking at the Greek most contemporary with Paul.

If we now ask how ‘robbery’ or ‘seizure’, as acts, have a typological basis in the account of the Fall, we find that a ‘seizure’ is the sense we should read in Gen 3:22, “lest he put forth his hand and take (seize) also of the tree of life”. The Hebrew verb is very common and ‘seize’ is one of the senses listed in Hebrew lexicons (e.g. see Holladay or Brown, Driver Briggs). The nuance that the word has is determined by context.

Is the situation envisaged by Gen 3:22 a kind of seizure or snatching, or even a stealing? The ‘putting forth of the hand’ doesn’t make this certain but it is consistent with this reading (cf. Exod 7:5). However, one of the elements for robbery is the presence of guards, and the placing of a guard (rmv) to the Tree of Life (‘to guard the way to the tree of life’, Gen 3:24) betrays the thinking of God – that to take of the tree would be robbery and that there might be force used to take of the tree.

We started with the most common kind of translation, but we have now presented the typological argument for the less common translation,

Who, being (u`pa,rcwn) in the form (morfh/|) of God, considered (h`gh,sato) it not robbery/seizure/snatching (a`rpagmo.n) to be equal with God (to. ei=nai i=sa qew/|) …

Whether we read ‘something to be grasped’ or ‘robbery/seizure/snatching’, the typology we have sketched applies to both translations except for Gen 3:22, where we place the typological (and deciding) justification for ‘robbery/seizure/snatching’. Our typological argument for Gen 3:22 decisively supports Moule’s grammatical analysis of a`rpagmo,j, (although not his reading – which is that ‘he did not regard equality with God as consisting in snatching’ – which is nonsense).[45]

The main alternative in scholarship to the above two readings is that Christ did have equality in the form of God. From this supposition a variety of additional readings follow, which we must consider before we can be certain that the ‘robbery’ reading is correct.

Equality

Did Christ have equality in being the form of God? Our argument has been that this goes against the typology Paul employs. Adam had equality in respect of the knowledge of good and evil after the Fall, but this affected access to the Tree of Life. He did not have equality in respect of living forever for which he needed to eat of the Tree of Life. Christ manifested God perfectly, and on this basis he did not consider it would be robbery to be equal with God in living forever, but nevertheless (avlla.) he submitted unto death.

Mullen observes,

… the word  ‘equal’ is neuter (neither masculine nor feminine) and plural. It cannot therefore refer to equality of person nor to absolute equality. The verse actually asserts that Jesus thought it not robbery to be ‘equal things’ with God.[46]

The Jews had accused Jesus of making himself equal with God (John 5:18), but Jesus’ reply makes it clear that any equality he had consisted in his doing what the Father did,

Therefore, Jesus answered and was saying to them, ‘Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of himself, unless it is something he sees the Father doing; for whatever the Father does, these things the Son also does in like manner. John 5:19 (NASB)

This is an equality of action (‘doing’) here and it is what it means for Jesus to manifest God. On this basis – being in the form of God – Jesus would naturally think of the future greater ‘equal things’ of the resurrection and judgement (John 5:20-22), things which the Father had given to him (John 5:22, 26). Jesus would therefore naturally conclude that to live forever would not be robbery on his part, but not because of any right he possessed, but because it could and would be given by God. In living forever, he would become the life-giving spirit, the Last Adam (1 Cor 15:45), ready for the work of resurrection and judgment. But would the Father give this before the crucifixion?

When did Christ think about equality? When did he think that it would not be a seizure to have equality? The obvious answer from vv. 7-8 is—as he faced his crucifixion. His will was for the cup to be removed (Luke 22:42) and he had at his disposal twelve legions of angels (Matt 26:53). He could have lived forever without the cross. It would only have needed the will of the Father to change for Jesus to live forever. In typological terms, this would be for the Father to instruct the guard to the Tree of Life to allow Jesus access and live forever. This shows that Christ did not think he had a right to live forever; equality was not his by right; he depended on the will of the Father changing. The example for us in vv. 7-8 is not that Christ relinquished something he possessed but that he obeyed the will of the Father.

If we put aside the reasoning above and now instead admit the presupposition that Christ had the equality he considered, we could construe a`rpagmo,j with a range of a different senses, again collecting these according to whether we take the word to signify an act or a thing. For instance,

1. Christ did not consider equality something onto which he should cling. Thus, his obedience is in not holding onto equality. The verb we choose to nuance a`rpagmo,j here can vary. This is the view of the Greek Fathers.
2. Christ did not consider his equality the result of acts like ‘snatching’ or ‘grasping’. He knew that it was his by right. Again, the nuance of the verb can vary. This is the view of the Latin Fathers.[47]
3. Christ did not consider his equality a matter of good fortune.[48] This view has been developed particularly during the 20c. stemming from the work of Werner Jaeger (1915).[49]
4. Christ did not consider taking advantage of his equality.[50] This view has been developed by R. W. Hoover (1971) and Wright (1986, 1991). It is now incorporated in the NRSV.

Of these options, Wright and Moule regard (1) as a “philological impossibility”.[51] Options (2), (3) and (4) only really make sense as considerations of Christ in his humanity rather than any pre-existent state, although this is not admitted by scholars. It would be bizarre to have God the Son thinking of his equality in terms of good fortune or an act of robbery. There is no history of the Trinity prior to the incarnation that allows us to frame this kind of thinking. For example, when was robbery an issue for the persons of the Trinity in their relations?  Similarly, it is difficult to see how God the Son would think about the advantage of his equality or that he had rights prior to the incarnation.[52] If Christ had equality in the form of God, then option (1) would seem the most consistent interpretation – consistent, that is, with the incarnation, but decorum would suggest that a`rpagmo,j be the neutral ‘hold onto’ and not the desperate ‘cling’. Wright and Moule regard (1) as philologically impossible (it is), but the theological problem here is whether the picture of the Godhead in any of the options (1) – (4) is at all likely in a Jewish monotheistic context.[53]

If we now consider options (1) – (4) describing Christ Jesus in his humanity, they all become possible from a theological point of view, except that now the passage loses any idea of pre-existence. The ‘being in the form of God’ is now about Christ’s humanity and not any pre-existence. The equality is whatever we understand by being in the form of God. All of the options, however, destroy our typological/positional comparison with Adam after the Fall,[54] which is that Adam did not have the equality of living forever.

Wright discusses the views of several scholars[55] who read v. 6 as both a reference to Christ’s perfect human life and consider that Christ had an equality with God. None of these views are our interpretation, and so Wright’s criticisms do not apply to us, but Wright’s main objection is worth flagging for later consideration which is that seeing a human Christ in v. 6 is out of chronological order because v. 7 is “the stage of Christ’s becoming human”.[56] Our counter-argument to Wright (below) will be that v. 7 is not about the incarnation but, instead, it is about the trial and crucifixion, and so the chronological order of vv. 6-7 is preserved.

If we take a`rpagmo,j to refer to an act, there is no prior act in which Christ obtained equality. There is no act of his (that we know about) that he can reflect upon and consider that it was not robbery. If, instead, we take Christ to have equality as a rightful possession, by dint of his birth or the bestowal of the Spirit, we have to explain why Christ would think that such possession wasn’t robbery.  Why have this thinking in the first place? The difficulty of these questions lead commentators to reject (2), but they are difficult only because the act of robbery is taken to be a prior act; the equality is assumed to be possessed.

The articular infinitive, to. ei=nai i=sa qew/ (being equal things with God) is consistent with either of the two readings: equality is prospective or equality is possessed. Typically, to. ei=nai with eivj is prospective (e.g. Rom 3:26, ‘that he might be just’; Eph 1:12, ‘That we should be to the praise of his glory’); to. ei=nai with dia. presumes the prior state (e.g. Luke 2:4, ‘because he was of the house and family of David’). We do not have either preposition in Phil 2:6 and Christ considering being equal with God carries no presupposition that he was or was not equal.

If Christ does not have the equality, then his thinking is about an equality he could have in the future, an equality that wouldn’t be robbery. The typology explains this thinking because, while Adam was not in the form of God, Jesus was; while for Adam, taking of the Tree of Life would be robbery, for Christ this would not. This is not to say that Christ thought he had a right to eternal life, but rather that he thought he could be given eternal life.

But made himself of no effect

The Greek verb here, keno,w, is often translated ‘emptied’; the KJV has ‘made himself of no reputation’ for the clause, which is idiosyncratic. Usage in the New Testament[57] would suggest either ‘emptied’ or ‘made of no effect’ (see Arndt and Gingrich). For example, faith would be void or empty or of no effect if the promises were inherited through the Law (Rom 4:14); or again, the cross of Christ might be made of no effect (1 Cor 1:17); or Paul’s boasting might be of no effect or vain (2 Cor 9:3). The corre­sponding noun, keno,j,  has a similar range of meanings: empty, vain, without effect, etc. (Arndt and Gingrich).

So at what point did Christ make himself of no effect, at what point did he not plead his reputation? He was powerless on the Mount of Olives, but during his trial he offered no defence, he pleaded no cause, and he allowed himself to be convicted. At all times he was able to call on as many as twelve legions of angels to his aid, and had not his Father given His Son into the hand of the authorities, they would have had no power over him.  As a sheep to the shearers, he was led to the slaughter, the lamb of the world.

The sequence here is that having considered equality in Gethsemane, he did not exercise any power in his arrest and trial. He took on the predicted character of the Servant of the Lord. This is also confirmed by the allusion to Isa 53:12 which reads, ‘he poured out his soul unto death’. It was in this process that Christ took on and fulfilled the work of the righteous servant who bore the sins of many.[58]

Being made in the likeness of men

The main verb (keno,w) is an aorist indicative and it is supported by two aorist participles ‘taking the form of a servant’ and ‘being made in the likeness of men’. The KJV reads, ‘and was made in the likeness of men’, which can read as if there is some connection between Christ making himself of no reputation and being made in the likeness of men. It can read as if he became a man after making himself of no reputation, but the conjunc­tion is absent in the Greek. The conjunction comes afterwards starting a new point in ‘and being found in fashion as a man’.

The RSV has ‘being born in the likeness of men’, but most translations go for the more neutral ‘being made in the likeness of men’. The Greek verb gi,nomai is capable of a wide range of meanings depending on context including ‘be, become, be born, be made’ (Arndt and Gingrich). The clause explains why Christ emptied himself and made himself powerless. The allusions again go back to Adam and the Suffering Servant.

1. ‘of men’ is quoting Gen 5:1 and ‘genealogy of men’ and ‘likeness’ is quoting Gen 5:3, ‘his own likeness’. This in turn is marking a contrast with ‘image and likeness of God’ (Gen 1:26) and making the trivial point that Adam begat in his own image and likeness. The ‘likeness of men’ phrase in Philippians is stating that Christ accepted he was in the lineage of men.
2. Christ was made in the likeness of men, and this was the work of God the Father (cf. Heb 2:7). The allusion for ‘made’ is to the Suffering Servant. God formed Christ from the womb to be his servant to bring Jacob again to him (Isa 42:1, 44:2, 49:5).

It follows from (1) and (2) that ‘form of God’ could not be an allusion to ‘image and likeness of God’ because Christ Jesus was made in the ‘likeness of men’. Paul requires the theology of Gen 5:1-3 and not the theology of Gen 1:26-27. There is an important nuance in this allusion: Christ did not empty himself because he knew he was a man or a mortal man; he made himself powerless because he accepted the teaching of Genesis 5 – that he was in the lineage of men (as per Luke’s genealogy).

And being found in fashion as a man

The phrase ‘being found in fashion as man’ is unusual; the Greek might be translated ‘being found in appearance as a man’, or something similar. The Greek word for ‘being found’ (eu`reqei.j) is an aorist passive participle, which suggests that Christ was found by others to be in fashion (sch/ma) as a man, rather than Christ found himself to be a man. When was Christ found in this way? Jesus was stripped naked during his scourging and ‘found’ to be a man (Matt 27:28). The unusual description might well be Paul’s euphemism for the stripping naked of Christ. Hence, he immedi­ate­ly follows on with the thought that Christ humbled himself on the cross and submitted to death.  The spectacle was humiliating but Paul’s point is also that Christ humbled himself – he allowed it to happen.

There is also a connection here with Genesis. Adam was naked and he hid; he was ‘found’ when he came out from hiding. Paul’s euphemism for the stripping naked of Christ is this ‘finding’ of Adam. Yahweh found Adam to be naked; likewise, Jesus was found in fashion as a man at his scourging. The reason for the typological language is to identify Jesus as Adam after the Fall. This is a further reason why the more common typological approach of comparing Christ to Adam before the Fall is wrong.

Was obedient unto death

The sequential order of Paul’s thought from Gethsemane to the Cross is complete, and this is why Wright’s defence of a pre-existence reading of v. 6 fails. The contrast with Adam could not be more pointed — he was disobedient unto death (cf. Rom 5:12), Christ was obedient unto death. The point of this emphasis is that Christ, knowing that he was in the lineage of men, was thereby ready to be obedient unto death, and to follow the course of a human life through to death. As a result, he was resurrected and highly exalted by God.

Wherefore God hath highly exalted him

And so God exalted him. The fact that Christ was exalted to be lord of all things reflects the intentions of the Genesis creation, and the mention of his exaltation at this point confirms our approach to the passage. God has highly exalted him so that he has lordship over all things, both in heaven and on earth. The touchstone of Adam’s lordship was his naming of the animals. So it is that the Scripture expresses Christ’s lordship in terms of naming: he has been given a name above every name (cf. Eph 2:21).

Christ’s lordship is also expressed in terms of Isa 45:23, “To me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear.” Some commentators argue that a divine identity is implied in the application of Isa 45:23 to Christ, words spoken by Yahweh. Commentators see a description of a divine being in the expression ‘in the form of God’. We have shown that this is not the case because the expression is not about divine nature. Rather, the divine identity of Yahweh is manifested in Christ but without any confusion of the persons. This is why the ‘divine identity’ incarnation metaphysics of scholars such as R. B. Bauckham, L. Hurtado and N. T. Wright fails.[59] The use of Isaiah here is about how men and women bow the knee before Yahweh in bowing before the lord of all the earth.

Wright expresses a common view when he says, “In Philippians 2:10f. Paul credits Jesus with a rank and honour which is not only in one sense appropriate for the true Man, the Lord of the world, but is also the rank and honour explicitly reserved, according to scripture, for Israel’s God and him alone.”[60] This generality applies to the honour of worship but not the honour of obeisance. What Wright fails to consider is the position of Jesus on earth as the representative of God, the Davidic king over the kingdom of God. The obeisance involved with regard to a king who represents Yahweh explains the use of Isa 45:23. If we ask, what was the obeisance in Isaiah’s day and how was it manifested on earth, the next oracle shows Bel bowing down (Isa 46:1). As the last line of the hymn states, every tongue confesses Jesus as lord to the glory of God the Father. This is the plenipotentiary role of Jesus’ lordship.

(B) Philology

It has been said that a`rpagmo,j is the most contested word in New Testament Studies. Why do the translations differ? They differ because a`rpagmo,j is rare; they differ because some translation committees use the more common a[rpagma and its ‘idiomatic’ occurrences as a guide; they differ because some regard the general difference between –ma/-mos  nouns as the best guide; and they differ because some committees are guided by the later usage of a`rpagmo,j in the Greek church fathers rather than Greek usage contemporary with Paul.[61] In addition to these philological choices, it also has to be recognised that translations can be influenced by theology and standard church doctrine; the philology is often mixed up with theology.

Philology takes priority over theology and the best evidence to determine the meaning of a`rpagmo,j would be contemporary Greek usage. However, the philology used by scholars can span several centuries and range over Classical, Hellenistic and Patristic Greek. If there are different philological possibilities, then theology (i.e. typology) can help make the correct decision. Putting the typology to one side (Section A), however, we should consider first where the balance of probabilities lies in respect of the philology.

Harpagmos

We need to examine the philology of a`rpagmo,j in more depth. The modern starting point is the analysis of Hoover supported by Wright. The word is very rare in the secular Greek that has come down to us; Moule gives the only four examples,[62] three with the sense of an act like ‘snatching/seizure’ and one is a grammatical discussion.

(1) The first example is in Plutarch,

And while the sort of love prevailing at Thebes and in Elis is to be avoided, as well as the so-called kidnapping in Crete, that which is found at Athens and in Lacedaemon is to be emulated.
καὶ τὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ καλούμενον ἁρπαγμόν

Plutarch (c. 50 CE – c. 120 CE) : De Lib 15 (online at perseus.tufts.edu)

Some translate a`rpagmo,j as ‘abduction’; either way, the use falls within the semantic range of ‘seizure/snatching’. On Crete, young boys were evidently snatched for sexual purposes.[63]

(2) The second example is an astrological work by Vettius Valens,

If Mars is appointed the destiny-determining-power and the Moon the marriage-arranger the wedding will be an abduction.[64]

…the marriage will be a great catch…

…the marriage will be one of force…[65]
…a`rpagmo,j o` ga,moj e;stai…

Vettius Valens (120 – c. 175 CE) : Anthology II. 38, p. 122

(3) There is a variation of to.n a`rpagmo,n for th.n a`rpagh,n in Pausanias (c. 110 CE – c. 180 CE): Description of Greece I. 20:3, a noun meaning ‘seizure, rapine, robbery, rape’ or ‘the thing seized, booty, prey’ (LS).

(4) Lastly, Phrynicus (2^nd cent. AD): Selection of Attic Words and Phrases discusses the word in the context of noun formations, which doesn’t add to the analysis.

The most contemporary evidence we have, (1) – (4), suggests a`rpagmo,j is an act, and we have already noted that –ma/-mos nouns differ, with each generally denoting the result of action and action respectively (see Mullen above in (A)).

Idiom and Idiomatic Expressions

The way to change the meaning of a`rpagmo,j in Phil 2:6 would be to argue that it is ‘idiomatic’ and this is the strategy of Hoover and Wright.[66] They base their case in later Greek usage (Heliodorus, c. 3c. – 4c. CE) and a cognate word, a[rpagma. Hoover states,

It appears, then, that when a[rpagma or a`rpagmo,j are used outside of a double accusative construction they convey meanings distinct from those which they connote when they occur as predicate accusatives.[67]

Hoover and Wright regard ouvc a`rpagmo.n h`gh,sato to. ei=nai i;sa qew/| as using an idiomatic expression but this usage is not idiomatic in a narrow sense. It is a double accusative construction[68] with a verb of cognition and this is a regular grammatical construction in Greek, that is, we think something (Acc.) about something (Acc.). Regular grammatical constructions are not in themselves ‘idiomatic’ in a narrow sense. However, the notion of ‘idiom’ is used more loosely to embrace regular grammatical construction (as in the title and content of Moule’s textbook, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek). Hoover and Wright may be guilty of confusing this distinction.

The distinction is worth noting because it’s possible to slide between the two senses. For ‘idiom’ narrowly defined, what we require is certain vocabulary and several examples across the literature.[69] A. Gibson offers the unexceptionable definition, “In an idiom the usual meaning of its constituents with their non-idiomatic values in normal usage cannot be employed, either in principle or in the current state of linguistic understanding of them, to predict the meaning of the idiom.”[70] On this definition, it is not clear that the database for a`rpagmo,j is at all large enough to establish its idiomatic and non-idiomatic uses (it isn’t).

What we should be looking for in an idiomatic expression (narrowly defined) is a regular association of particular words, some of which do not carry their normal semantic values. It is possible that we could mistake grammatical features that broadly define the idiomatic character of a language for features that contribute to an ‘idiom’ narrowly conceived. For example, if we argue that a`rpagmo,j is idiomatic in a narrow sense, then we would be arguing that it doesn’t have what we might expect as a normal meaning of ‘seizure/snatching’. However, a double accusative grammatical construction is not idiomatic in the narrow sense and if we want to justify a narrow idiomatic sense for a`rpagmo,j we need to show usage of particular vocabulary. In short, regular grammatical construction is not part of the narrow idiom we want to identify because it is not a particular word combination. Furthermore, it is not clear that we cannot employ ‘normal’ usage to predict the meaning of some of Hoover and Wright’s claimed non-idiomatic usage.

For example, take the following passage from Josephus,

For when his master’s wife was fallen in love with him, both on account of his beauty of body and his dexterous management of affairs; and supposed, that if she should make it known to him, she could easily persuade him to come and lie with her, and that he would look upon it as a piece of happy fortune that his mistress should entreat him…
euvtu,chma h`ghsa,menon to. th.n de,spoinan auvtou/ dehqh/nai

Jos Ant. 2.41 (online at perseus.tufts.edu)

We have (in the underlined clause) a translation of a double accusative with a verb of cognition. The grammatical construction is not in itself idiomatic, though it is regular; further there is nothing out of the ordinary in the senses given to the vocabulary. We have no reason to think we have an idiom in this text.

If the target for narrow idiom treatment is only a`rpagmo,j, and if the other word(s) in the claimed idiomatic expression carry a normal sense (i.e. they are verbs of cognition), then it’s not clear we have an idiomatic expression in the narrow sense, given that grammatical construction is not idiomatic; Hoover and Wright’s argument appears to fail. Their goal is semantic change for a`rpagmo,j  which requires an argument showing an idiom in the narrow sense; they focus on the double accusative construction, which will only give them ‘idiomatic’ in a general sense at best, and they retain normal usage for the verbs of cognition.

For example, if we consider to. ei=nai i;sa qew/|/, this is an articular infinitive,[71] a common grammatical construction in its own right. Translations commonly render this as ‘equality with God’, assigning normal semantic values. There is no idiomatic change. The same point obviously applies for ouvc and h`gh,sato. If all we are claiming is that ouvc a`rpagmo.n h`gh,sato to. ei=nai i;sa qew/| is idiomatic in the general sense of being a regular grammatical construction, we have to show how this contributes to a`rpagmo,j being idiomatic in a narrow sense; why is it not the case that a`rpagmo,j is just displaying a normal meaning from its semantic range for a particular context within a double accusative construction?

Because a`rpagmo,j is rare, Hoover and Wright’s argument for ouvc a`rpagmo.n h`gh,sato to. ei=nai i;sa qew/|  being idiomatic is based on an analogy being drawn between a`rpagmo,j and a]`rpagma and the ‘idiomatic’ occurrence of a[rpagma in double accusative constructions. It is ironic, but the whole discussion now shifts to a[rpagma and away from a`rpagmo,j.

Harpagma

A typical lexicon entry for a[rpagma is ‘prey, spoil, booty’ and an example text would be,

For he did not overrun Asia like a robber nor was he minded to tear and rend it, as if it were booty (a[rpagma) and plunder bestowed by unexpected good fortune…But Alexander desired to render all upon earth subject to one law of reason and one form of government and to reveal all men as one people, and to this purpose he made himself conform.
οὐδ᾽ ὥσπερ ἅρπαγμα καὶ λάφυρον εὐτυχίας ἀνελπίστου σπαράξαι καὶ ἀνασύρασθαι διανοηθείς…………ἀλλ᾽ ἑνὸς ὑπήκοα λόγου τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ μιᾶς πολιτείας

Plutarch De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 8 (online at perseus.tufts.edu)

Or again,

Hereupon Nehemiah shed tears, out of pity of the calamities of his countrymen; and, looking up to heaven, he said, ‘How long, O Lord, will you overlook our nation, while it suffers so great miseries, and while we are made the prey (a[rpagma) and scorn of all men?’

Josephus Ant. 11.162 (online at perseus.tufts.edu)

Or again,

The matter is not harpagma nor a bargain available to anyone who wants it, but requires much counsel in order to be effected properly and much preparation in order to be accomplished safely.
ouv ga.r a]`rpagma to. pra/gma ouvde. eu;wnon kai. tw/n evn me,sw|

Heliodorus Aethiopica IV.6[72]

Here, Heliodorus is referring to the abduction of Chariclea and using a]`rpagma metaphorically describing her as ‘booty’.

We also have several examples of a[rpagma in the LXX denoting an act (Ps 61:11; Isa 61:8; Ezek 22:23; Pss 2:24) as well as a thing (Lev 5:23; Job 29:17; Isa 42:22; Mal 1:13; Sir 16:13). To cite one example of a[rpagma as an act,

For I the Lord love justice, I hate robbery and wrong; I will faithfully give them their recompense, and I will make an everlasting covenant with them. Isa 61:8 (RSV)

Translations may differ, and they may have sometimes an ‘act’ and sometimes a ‘thing’ in the LXX texts. Hoover and Wright’s analysis is that a[rpagma is flexible on this score.

Synonymy?

What we require in order to assert a general interchangeable synonymy with a[rpagma is a similar range of examples for a`rpagmo,j denoting an act and a thing. The rarity of a`rpagmo,j precludes such a finding and so the analogy between a`rpagmo,j and a[rpagma is based on, first, the point that the –ma/-mos distinction noted above in (A) is not universal and, secondly, that the ‘act-thing’ flexibility of a[rpagma could accommodate the ‘acts’ that a`rpagmo,j might reference.[73] Any special sense for a[rpagma in a double accusative construction could then also be asserted for a`rpagmo,j in a double accusative construction. However, we should instead maintain that there can be no presumption that synonymy would obtain inside idiomatic expressions; this would have to be shown, even if the philological exercise has been forced to focus on a[rpagma because of the rarity of a`rpagmo,j.

Hoover offers one example of synonymy between a`rpagmo,j and a[rpagma:[74]

…some … regarded death as harpagma in comparison with the depravity of ungodly men…
τινες … τὸν θάνατον ἅρπαγμα θέμενοι τῆς τῶν δυσσεβῶν μοχθηρίας.

Eusebius Eccl. Hist. 8.12.2

And Peter considered death by means of the cross harpagmon on account of the hope of salvation…

o` Pe,troj de a`rpagmo.n to.n dia. staurou/ qa,naton evpoiei/to dia. ta.j swteri,ous evlpi,daj

Eusebius Comm. in Luc. 6

Hoover’s analysis of these two texts by Eusebius is,

Not only are a[rpagma and a`rpagmo,j used synonymously in these two statements, but they are used synonymously by the same author in reference to the same object – death – and in expressions whose form precisely parallels that of the remark in Phil. 2:6.[75]

Putting aside the point that Eusebius is a 4c. CE Christian writer and the issue of whether his Greek is a good guide for understanding a 1c. Paul, the synonymy claim is false. The Commentary on Luke considers the manner of death and thus has a focus on process and act; the Ecclesiastical History is considering the fact of death. What we have in Eusebius’ two texts is an illustration of the –ma/-mos distinction. There isn’t a ‘same object’ — death — for the two texts.

Moreover, J. C. O’Neil’s alternative interpretation of Eusebius’ Greek is plausible. In the Commentary on Luke, he says, Eusebius’ point is that crucifixion was a ‘robbery’ from the executioners because it would be Peter’s way to salvation.[76] We might well think that Eusebius was describing Peter’s thinking in this way because of the use of a`rpagmo,j in Philippians, which is a text about crucifixion. If Christ did not see equality with God as a robbery, and achieved equality through crucifixion, Eusebius could well have chosen to describe Peter’s view of crucifixion as a robbery, not from God, but from the executioners. As for the other text, in the Ecclesiastical History, O’Neil says Eusebius’ point is that Christians facing martyrdom regarded “death as a prize snatched from the wickedness of evil men”.[77]

Harpadzō

What about the related verb – a`rpazw? Arndt and Gingrich offer ‘steal, carry off, drag away, snatch, take away’ for the range of meanings. For example,

…the Corinthians did not seize the advantage/take advantage of the situation…
Ouvc h;rpasan oi` Kori,nqoi th,n pleonexi,an

Plutarch Timoleon 23

…to seize the opportunity…
a`rpa,zein to.n kairo,n

Plutarch Philopoemon 15.2

These are normal examples of the use of the verb with different abstract objects; they are neither metaphorical not idiomatic.[78] It is a common verb and there is nothing to note here except that acts of seizure (a`rpagmo,j) and things seized (a[rpagma) are cognate nouns. C. Fletcher-Louis sums it up when he says of the meaning proposed for a`rpagmo,j, “This, of course is what we would expect given the meaning of the widely attested cognate words harpazō (“to seize, snatch up, plunder”) and harpagma (“booty, spoil”).”[79]

Harpagma in Double Accusative Constructions

We can now look at a[rpagma in double accusative constructions. Hoover’s thesis is stated thus,

It appears, then, that when a[rpagma or a`rpagmo,j are used outside of a double accusative construction they convey meanings distinct from those which they connote when they occur as predicate accusatives. It follows from this that interpretations of a`rpagmo,j in Phil. 2:6 which are based on texts in which a[rpagma and a`rpagmo,j occur outside of double accusative formulations fail to recognize the character and the import of the language they attempt to explain.[80]

The first example he offers is from Heliodorus’ Aethiopica. This is a mid-3c. CE or early 4c. CE collection of romance stories.

(1)

Cybele regarded the chance meeting as harpagma and as the beginning of a way of capturing [them]…
h` dh. Kube,lh th.n xuntuci,an a;rpagma kai.…poihsame,nh

Aethiopica VII.11

(2)

A young man so handsome and in his prime thrusts away a young woman of similar qualities who yearns for him, and does not regard the matter as harpagma nor even as a piece of good luck. …
kai. ouvc a;rpagma ouvde e;pmaion poiei/tai to. Pra/gma…

Aethiopica VII.20

(3)

Arsace regarded what [Cybele] said as harpagma, and her longstanding jealousy was heightened with anger because of what she related [concerning Theagenes’ intransigence]. ‘You have spoken well,’ she said, ‘I shall take care to command that the offending female be done away with’.
a;rpagma to r`hqe.n e`poih,sato h`  vArsa,kh…

Aethiopica VIII.7

Hoover translates a[rpagma here as ‘something to take advantage of’ and for contextual reasons – understanding the story. The question, however, is whether we have here an idiomatic use of a[rpagma in any narrow sense. If we do, is it dependent on the double accusative construction? If we don’t have an idiomatic use, then these examples would illustrate just an extension to the range of non-idiomatic meanings that a[rpagma can bear.

Another example from Eusebius is noted by Hoover,

(4)

Those who have lived destitute lives for a long time attended by sordidness which no one should have to endure, if they consider such a return harpagma and if from now on they lay aside their anxieties, may live among us without fear.
…oi-on a[rpagma, ti th.n evpa,nodon poihsa,menoi…

Eusebius Vita Constantini 31.2

This text refers to exiles looking to return to their homeland and this is plausibly taken to be something to their advantage.

Since there is a common verb poie,w to the examples, the combination of poie,w + a[rpagma might be idiomatic, but poie,w carries its normal sense, so that all we have is one word for any idiom in any narrow sense. This is the theoretical difficulty with Hoover’s method: when we have only one word proposed for narrow idiom status, how do we know it is not just the discourse context that is selecting its meaning and that this meaning is just part of its normal semantic range across our time period?

O’Neil notes[81] an exception to the pattern that Hoover highlights, an exception acknowledged by Hoover. In Isidore of Pelusium (4c. CE – 5c. CE) we have an exegesis of Phil 2:6,

If he considered being equal a windfall, he would not have humbled himself, lest doing the work of a servant be made an inference about his status…For once a servant has been set free and honoured with sonship, he would not consent to menial work since he regards his status as booty or a windfall [and therefore as something which he could lose; but he who is a son by birth has no such fears, Isidore goes on to say].
a`,th a;rpagma h; eu`,rema th.n avxian hvghsa,menoj

Fourth Epistle v. 22

This is an example of a verb of cognition with a double accusative where a[rpagma is properly ‘booty’. This example suggests that perhaps it is the romance subject of Heliodorus (the discourse context) that is the main factor in determining the ‘advantage’ meaning of a[rpagma in that work rather than the use of a[rpagma in an ‘idiomatic’ double accusative construction with a verb of cognition.

Harpagmos in Double Accusative Constructions

In addition to the example in Eusebius Comm. in Luc. 6, there is one other case of a`rpagmo,j in a double accusative construction, again in a church father, Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444). In his De adoratione he remarks on the visit of the angels to Lot (Genesis 19). When the angels refused Lot’s offer of lodging,

…meizo,nwj katebia,zeto kai. ouvc a`rpagmo.n th.n parai,thsin w`j evx avdranou/j kai. u`dareste,raj evpoiei/to freno,j…

Cyril of Alexandria De adoratione I.25

How a`rpagmo,j is understood in this remark is disputed. Hoover offers the translation,

He did not regard [their] polite refusal (parai,thsij) as something to take advantage of [because it would ‘get him off the hook’] as if [his invitation had come] from a listless and feeble heart.[82]

But O’Neil observes[83] that this reads parai,thsij as ‘refusal’ when its other common meaning of ‘entreaty’ would be better. The subject is Lot’s entreaty and the angels’ refusal. Taking parai,thsij as ‘refusal’ requires Hoover to invent another noun ‘invitation’ in order to make sense of the Greek. O’Neil’s reading is that Lot considered his entreaty as something he couldn’t immediately take (snatch) back, as if it came from someone with a listless and feeble heart, but he pressed his offer upon the angels greatly.[84]

The only two examples of a`rpagmo,j in a double accusative construction with a verb of cognition that we actually have do not support the thesis that we have an idiom. They show the danger in presuming that any idiom if established for a[rpagma would by analogy work for a`rpagmo,j. The examples have the same verb of cognition, but its sense is normal. We find that we are again faced with the methodological difficulty of arguing for a one-word idiom on the basis of common Greek construction and normal usage for other words. As for the target word, we find that we can gather its sense from the context, which allows us to ask if the double accusative construction and the verb of cognition are all that relevant to its meaning.[85]  On these counts, the examples fail the criterion for identifying narrow idioms, viz. that we should not be able to predict the idiom from normal usage.

Identifying Idioms

Take a common English example of an idiom: ‘you’re pulling my leg’, ‘I’m not pulling your leg’, ‘You’re getting your leg pulled’, ‘It’s leg pull time’, etc. As masters of a live language, we have no trouble identifying the same idiom in these utterances. We could analyse the idiom as ‘leg+pull’ and clearly neither ‘leg’ nor ‘pull’ carry their normal sense.

This raises the question of identity for our text – what is the idiom in question? Wright offers a`rpagmo.n h`gei/sqai, ti as ‘the idiom’[86] but this is a schema not used by Hoover. Nevertheless, on analogy with the English ‘leg+pull’ example, the schema is correctly formulated. Our argument is that because h`gei/sqai, carries a normal sense and ti is serving as a variable for any number of accusative constructions, it’s not clear we have enough in the schema to identify an idiom in the narrow sense.

This lack leads to problems for the objective of successfully identifying an idiom in our text. Is a`rpagmo,j itself an idiom, or is a`rpagmo.n hgei/sqai, the idiom, or indeed a`rpagmo.n hgei/sqai, ti.

Wright asserts[87] that the adverb negates the idiom a`rpagmo.n hgei/sqai, ti as a whole, giving ‘he did not consider-it-something-to-take-advantage-of’. However, Hoover says that “the fundamental linguistic datum” is ouvc a`rpagmo.n h`gh,sato to. ei=nai i=sa qew/| rather than a`rpagmo,j, which is a different definition as it includes ouvc. What then is the idiom?[88]

The differences between Hoover’s examples and Phil 2:6 are plain: the verb of cognition, noun, and word order. If we are to make an analogy between a[rpagma and a`rpagmo,j, we will require some abstraction like stipulating that the idiom consists in a range of verbs of cognition, which is the strategy that Hoover and Wright employ. This just masks the difficulty inherent in identifying a narrow idiom when the target is really just one word. Talk about a range of verbs is talk about a family of idioms and not an idiom. Each idiom should stand on its own merit.

While double accusatives and articular infinitives are common Greek constructions, since in Phil 2:6 one of the accusatives (the object) is an articular infinitive, for any idiomatic analogy with a[rpagma to work, we should really have accusative articular infinitives for the object in our database of claimed idiomatic expressions for a[rpagmav. This is a stronger requirement than simply insisting on a double accusative construction.[89] Hoover doesn’t address this point.

The particle ouv/ouvc normally comes immediately before the verb it negates,[90] but in ouvc a`rpagmo.n h`gh,sato to. ei=nai i=sa qew/| it is placed before the noun. This suggests that it is the noun that is negated, so that we have ‘not robbery’ (or ‘not something to be grasped’). Wright places ‘not’ before the verb in his translation, but doesn’t show why ‘he considered-it (not) something-to-take-advantage-of’, which gives a different sense, is unacceptable.[91] To take one of Hoover’s examples,

kai. ouvc a;rpagma ouvde e;pmaion poiei/tai to. Pra/gma…

this would appear to show, on Wright’s terms, that an ouvc… ouvde structure can intersect an idiom (if we think we are analysing an idiom).

Identifying a pattern in usage obviously doesn’t make that usage idiomatic in a narrow sense without criteria being satisfied for the presence of an ‘idiom’. Wright’s proposal for the idiom of a`rpagmo.n h`gei/sqai, ti begs the question: how do we know that it isn’t just a`rpagmo,j that is the idiom? How do we know that the ouvc isn’t just negating a`rpagmo,j? How do we know that ouvc is not pulling a`rpagmo,j out (so to speak) from being part of a larger idiom?

It should be clear from this discussion that the underlying problem for our objective of identifying a narrow idiom is that our target is just one word; both the verb of cognition and the accusative object are variable elements, the vocabulary of which are not in our analytical sights; indeed, the vocabulary of the predicative accusative could also expand and acquire a negative particle. The question is: do we have a one-word idiom or just a word with a meaning from its normal semantic range embedded in our text with regular Greek constructions?

Articular Infinitive

The articular infinitive can be used to “refer to something previously mentioned or otherwise well known”;[92] they can also presume what has been previously been mentioned. For example,

Oi=da ga.r o[ti ouvk oivkei/ evn evmoi,( tou/tV e;stin evn th/| sarki, mou( avgaqo,n\ to. ga.r qe,lein para,keitai, moi( to. de. katerga,zesqai to. kalo.n ou;\
For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. (Rom 7:18)

The articular infinitives here presume what Paul has just said about the flesh but do not refer to the flesh; they refer to the will.

ivdou. ga.r auvto. tou/to to. kata. qeo.n luphqh/nai po,shn kateirga,sato u`mi/n spoudh,n(
For behold what earnestness this very thing, this godly sorrow, has produced in you: … (2 Cor 7:11)

The articular infinitive here, guided by the demonstrative, refers to what has just been mentioned in 2 Cor 7:10, viz. godly sorrow (qeo.n lu,ph).

In Phil 2:6, the double accusative with the verb of cognition evidently presumes o]j evn morfh/| qeou/ u`pa,rcwn but the articular infinitive itself presumes ouvc a`rpagmo.n h`gh,sato, because it is part of a double accusative construction. There is nothing here in the grammar that allows us to say Christ Jesus had equality; we can only interpret ‘being in the form of God’ as implying the possession of equality if that is our theology (but see Section A).

Examining the examples of a`rpagmo,j and a[rpagma, some presuppose ‘possession’ of the object and some do not;[93] contextual elements determine this question. So, Peter is not dead when he considers death (Eusebius Comm. in Luc. 6), nor were the martyrs (Eusebius Eccl. Hist. 8.12.2); Lot however has made his entreaty and cannot take it back (Cyril of Alexandria De adoratione I.25). The Heliodorus examples of a[rpagma also naturally have the ‘thing’ for which they will take advantage. Once again the philology leaves the question as to whether Christ had equality a matter for theology.

Summary of Findings

We think things about things. Verbs of cognition can be used in double accusative constructions; this is ‘idiomatic’ in a broad sense, but this is not significant for contributing to the meaning of a particular idiom. If a[rpagma or a`rpagmo,j are idiomatic in a narrow sense in a double accusative construction, this is not because they are in such a construction; it will be because of elements in the broader context that indicate idiomatic usage.

We might well ask whether the double accusative construction and the meaning of a[rpagma as ‘to take advantage of’ is just the consequence of the restricted number of examples that we can cite from the literature, or whether there is something about double accusative constructions and a verb of cognition that would block a description of someone considering something as a robbery or prey? Once we pose this question, the evidential weakness of Hoover and Wright’s ‘pattern’ becomes clear. It cites a few texts and is overly reliant (by necessity) on a[rpagma. There’s nothing we can say about verbs of cognition and grammatical constructions that is going to exclude ‘robbery’ or ‘something to be grasped’.

Still, looking at the texts we have cited, and accepting for the sake of argument that ‘to take advantage of’ is an idiomatic meaning in the narrow sense, we have listed four texts with a double accusative construction where we can read this sense, all for a[rpagma (Heliodorus, Aethiopica VII.11, VII.20, VIII.7; Eusebius Vita Constantini 31.2), and three texts with a double accusative construction (Eusebius, Comm. In Luc. 6 (a`rpagmo,j); Isidore of Pelusium Fourth Epistle v. 22 (a[rpagma); and Cyril of Alexandria, De adoratione I.25 (a`rpagmo,j)), where we can read ‘non-idiomatic’ meanings.

Hoover and Wright do put forward a legitimate proposal for a`rpagmo,j based on late examples; it competes with older proposals as ‘the thinking of Paul’. What they can’t do is strengthen their proposal with the claim that we have an idiomatic meaning in the narrow sense for a`rpagmo,j, saying this is why older proposals are wrong. Our argument takes away their advantage and once again the playing field is levelled and in this game, Moule’s points about Greek grammar and contemporary usage wins the game of judging what a`rpagmo,j means on a balance of probabilities.

The papers of Hoover and Wright are substantial in their treatment of the philology, but the texts are few in number. O’Neil’s paper is short and focuses on the exceptions to Hoover’s evidence. Our conclusion, reviewing the evidence that Hoover presents, is that he has not established his case – that Paul uses a narrow idiomatic expression with a`rpagmo,j. The distinction between –ma/-mos nouns and the Greek examples most contemporary with Paul suggest a sense of ‘seizure/snatching/robbery’ for a`rpagmo,j. O’Neil’s conclusion from his analysis of the same data is,

To consider equality with God as though it were either robbery or not robbery is near nonsense, yet that seems to be the only choice left.[94]

O’Neil seems to be between a rock and a hard place. But what O’Neil fails to do is read Paul typologically and so he is driven to think that the text is actually corrupt (a desperate expedient). Once we factor in the new typological reading from Section A, O’Neil’s quandary is dissipated.

(C) Concluding Remarks

L Hurtado notes that most scholars consider that Phil 2:5-11 contains a hymn but that this view is not common before the 20c. He observes that the highly compressed phrasing and syntactical structure lead scholars to take this view.[95] This genre assignment is not important for us except to note that the ‘highly compressed phrasing’ is indicative of a highly compressed set of allusions. That is, if someone were to object that we see too much allusiveness in the passage, what we see is not out of step with scholarly treatment of the passage; both Wright and Dunn see multiple allusions in the text, including allusions to the Suffering Servant of Isaiah and Adam. Our case is that they get the allusions to Adam wrong.

Approaches to Phil 2:5-11 are mired in traditional ways of reading. For example, the comparison with Adam supposedly ‘grasping’ the fruit. Making this the basis of a contrast with Christ not seizing or using to his advantage his equality gets off to the wrong start. This typological comparison doesn’t reflect what is in the Genesis story. On the other hand, the possibility of an act of robbery is presupposed in Yahweh guarding the Tree of Life, and once this allusion is seen, the older comparison with Adam grasping the fruit just falls away.

There is also the question of pre-existence. Commentators have faced the difficult theological questions that the pre-existence reading of the text throws up. For example, Dunn asks, “Is Christ Jesus then to be envisaged as making an Adamic choice at some time (!) in eternity? A choice in effect to become man? That is the almost inevitable corollary.” Wright faces[96] the difficulty of explaining how the name ‘Christ Jesus’ was a name of God the Son in eternity and how such a choice would be ‘Adamic’ in eternity. Whether he is successful is another question. He offers an answer based on how reference can work, but doesn’t offer any evidence for his proposal. For example, the sense that determines the reference of ‘the Prime Minister studied economics at Oxford in the 1940s’ spoken in 1986 doesn’t translate to ‘the person who became Prime Minister’ in any logico-linguistic account of how and why the reference of ‘the Prime Minister’ succeeds [Wright speaks of Margret Thatcher]. Wright’s analogy fails to explain the reference of ‘Christ Jesus’; he has no philosophical logic to offer as to how ‘Christ Jesus’ could be used to refer to God the Son before the incarnation in a letter from the mid-50s CE. Instead, we should see that the reference of the title is settled by the fact that the whole text is about Christ Jesus the man facing up to his crucifixion. We conclude with the opinion of J. Murphy O’Connor, which Dunn expresses as follows,

The common belief that Phil. 2:6-11 starts by speaking of Christ’s pre-existent state and status and then his incarnation is, in almost every case, a presupposition rather than a conclusion, a presupposition which again and again proves decisive in determining how disputed terms within the Philippians hymn should be understood.[97]

This remark is undoubtedly correct, although more so for Wright than for Hoover. The possibility for going back to the foundations and seeing what Pauline theology can actually be constructed is precluded by a prior commitment to Trinitarianism. Here Dunn is better placed than Wright, but he still has to forgo the traditional Adamic Christology that he expounds.