Professor Louis attempts to analyse “British disengagement in the Middle East during the period of the Labour Government”. There are extensive chapters on “British Defence of the Middle East” and on the Israeli-Arab conflict. But every local issue is very capably set in its regional, or even global context. The Middle East had been seen by Britain as the shield that protected Africa from Russian expansion. For this reason Egypt, the Suez Canal, and Palestine formed a vital strategic base.
But post-war Britain could no longer afford to maintain these bases, especially since India had gone. It was thanks to Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, that Britain did not abandon these outposts much earlier. Egypt resented the British occupation, and did not seem to be frightened of Russia. The Americans warned Britain to move its bases to safer parts such as Kenya, yet took care not to become too involved with Britain’s problems. Relations between America and Britain became rather strained over the problem of Palestine. The opposing claims of Jewish nationalism and Arab friendship finally resulted in the British decision that Palestine was expendable.
Professor Louis says that the British did not actively collude with the Arabs against Israel. Some observers would question the truth of this statement. America did not regard the British bases in the area as essential; and America perceived Israel’s military strength before Britain did, and as a result pressed for the new state to be harnessed to the Western alliance. Bevin was in a quandary and had staked his reputation on solving the problem. His mind was finally made up when the Israelis shot down five R A.F. Spitfires in January 1949. Britain did not want to have a war against an alliance of America and Israel, and finally withdrew.
Professor Louis does not mention that by 1951 the chief of the Imperial General Staff was in Israel seeking a secret military alliance between Britain and Israel. Britain’s heavy-handed way with Jewish refugees was too fresh in the memory, and Israel was not ready for an alliance; but Ben Gurion made a surprising counter-proposal that Israel should be admitted into the British Commonwealth.
While a secret alliance suited Britain, it did not seem appropriate for Israel to join the British family of nations, and so nothing was achieved. One reason could have been the fact that Britain had set up Abdullah as king of Transjordan. He figured that the more Britain could be involved with him, the better it would be for his unviable desert kingdom. So although Britain was out of Palestine, and did not have Israel as an ally, it was still deeply involved in affairs in the Middle East.
This is a superb history of 800 pages, based on masses of private material in Britain, Israel and America. It could well become required reading for students of Middle East politics. For a historian who has not the perception of the Divine hand in human affairs, it is a truly masterly work.
Review of “The Early Earth” by John Whitcomb (1972)