The Moral Appraisal of the Law of Moses

Introduction

How should we appraise the morality of the Law of Moses? This is a question of method. We might bring to bear moral philosophy or the cultural norms of our own society or social group. We might evaluate the Law against contemporary laws in the ANE if we could be secure of our dates for the Law and the comparative material. These are all, perhaps, obvious points. The purpose of raising these questions is to say that we should discuss our method of approach first when we consider the moral appraisal of the Law. The issue here is how we avoid or address a charge of moral relativism—the charge that whatever we say has no authority and no intrinsic value—that is just our judgment or just the judgment of our society or  just the viewpoint of an ANE society.

The problem for the moral appraisal of the Law of Moses, as opposed to, say, English Law, is that the body of laws purports to be from God. We might dismiss this claim and affirm instead that the laws just reflect the values of Israelite society; this would allow us to compare like with like, i.e. compare the laws in the Law of Moses with other society-engendered laws from the ANE. If, however, we accept that the Law of Moses is from God through inspiration, then we have the methodological problem of finding a valid basis of comparison with any other laws and values practised in human societies. It isn’t obvious that there is a like-for-like basis of comparison when there is a divine author behind the law we choose to evaluate. The point here is that the knowledge informing a divine law is of a different order to the knowledge that informs the laws that have been engendered in human society.

We might give up on this moral appraisal of divine law because of the methodological problem of justifying the exercise. Before we do this, we could ask whether God invites us to appraise his laws and reason with him. In this context, we might think of Job or Isaiah as examples of divine-human reasoning. However, these are live engagements and we have only the written Law of Moses to appraise. We could separate off other Scripture from the Law of Moses and appraise the Law in terms of development and change in divine thinking; we might say that the NT shows a ‘God of Love’ and the Law shows a ‘God of Judgment’. If we are not bringing to bear our own societal thinking, then we could be setting later revelation against earlier revelation.

These seem to be the main strategies for moral appraisal of the Law of Moses: (1) the moral appraisal of some of the Mosaic laws can arise just from our own (societal) thinking, which is a product of many cultural influences, although it could be more focused and be an application of a moral principle or doctrine that we declare up-front in our analysis. (2) It could be based on comparison with contemporary laws of the ANE and give us reason to configure some of the laws to be more palatable or understandable. (3) It could be based on a specific comparison with modern law-making and have regard to questions of evidence-gathering, the correct bar of evidence and proof, the circumstances that are brought within the purview of Law, and the appropriateness and proportionality of sanctions. Or (4) it could be derived from Scripture, perhaps just the Law itself, or more broadly including later revelation like the NT. The quality of our appraisal will depend on where we are coming from, how it is framed and whether there is any clear basis of evaluation enunciated.

Scriptural Appraisal

One kind of scriptural appraisal is centred in “our knowledge of Yahweh”. We look at a law and we say that this is not consistent with our understanding of Yahweh’s character. When we do this we are probably implicitly contrasting our knowledge of Yahweh derived from later Scripture, say, the NT, with the law under scrutiny. There is a problem with this judgment because both parts of Scripture are from Yahweh. So, we appear to be saying that Yahweh is inconsistent in the exercise of his character, perhaps loving and compassionate in the provision of Jesus, but harsh and brutal in the punishments of some laws. We introduce our own evaluative terms here – ‘harsh’, ‘brutal’ – but the first problem in our appraisal is that we set revelation against revelation; our choice of language is only the second problem. In terms of the performance of his character, can Yahweh be morally changeable? This is a theological question in the doctrine of God and it seems difficult to justify. That is, it seems difficult to justify given our a priori reasoning about the nature of God in morally perfect terms.

The more likely explanations for our judgment that this or that law does not sit comfortably with our understanding of Yahweh’s character is one or all of the following: (i) our understanding of his character is at fault; (ii) the law is partly the product of human thinking, the Israelite society of the day; or (iii) that we have not understood the reasoning behind the law.

Looking at the laws, we might focus on the subject-matter of a law, which would be a concern about things like – whether there should be such a law in the first place or whether the law if well-expressed. Or we might focus on the ‘punishment’ or ‘sanction’ and consider whether the law was appropriate and proportionate. Our judgment that a sanction was not appropriate or proportionate might come from our cultural background, a point of moral philosophy, or it might be judgment within the terms of the Law. A system of laws might not be self-consistent on this point. On the other hand, the Law might be consistent and set a context for a judgment that one of its laws was appropriate and proportionate.

Seizing Genitals

Let us take an example,

If men strive (~yviªn”a] WcåN”yI-yki() together, a husband, and the wife of one comes near to deliver her husband from the hand of the one who is striking him, and puts out her hand and seizes his genitals, then you shall cut off her hand, your eye shall not pity her. Deut 25:11-12 (NASB revised)

This law is not about men striving together, since no sanction attaches to such strife; the strife is a background condition for the law. The law concerns the action of a wife. The situation is entirely imaginable insofar as women have been portrayed getting involved in a fight between two men more than once in, for example, movies.

We can ask evaluative questions of this law. But first we need to answer some points of context. The opening expression ‘If men strive…’ (~yviªn”a] WcåN”yI-yki() quotes the Hebrew of Exod 21:22. In that law, a woman is also involved and possible injury to the woman and an unborn child is envisaged. In this law, one of the men is also the husband of the woman. As well as the quotation, we have the same types of individual and circumstance covered in both laws. In the Exodus law, if there is injury, then the ‘eye for an eye’ principle operates. This gives us a legal framework for evaluating the Deuteronomy law for consistency regarding appropriateness and proportionality.[1]

If men strive (~yviªn”a] WcåN”yI-yki() with each other and strike a woman with child so that she gives birth prematurely, yet there is no injury, he shall surely be fined as the woman’s husband may demand of him, and he shall pay as the judges decide. But if there is injury, then you shall appoint life for life, eye for eye… Exod 21:22-24 (NASB revised)

The law in Deut 25:11-12 supplements this law because the original Exodus law considered possible injury to a woman caught up in a fight between two men, one of whom is her husband, but said nothing about any injury to the other man inflicted by the woman. We have a context in which sanctions relate to injury and not just to the holding of genitalia. In fact, if there is no injury, a fine would be appropriate in a case involving Deut 25:11-12, using Exod 21:22f as the base law.

There is a further point to note in the setting of the two laws: ‘judges’ are explicitly referenced.  It may seem an incidental point in a body of laws. This is explicit in Exod 21:22, but the re-use of ‘men’ (~yviªn”a) from Deut 25:1-3 brings the judge mentioned there to the context of Deut 25:11-12. Deuteronomy 25:1-3 is about a ‘controversy’ between men, whereas Deut 25:11 is about a strife (fight) between men and so it may be that a different kind of judge was involved, namely, the type of judge (lyliP‘) involved in the law of Exod 21:22f. This kind of judge (3x, MT) would appear to adjudicate sexual matters (Job 31:11, NASB; Deut 32:31, with the euphemisms of v. 32). Of course, it may be the same elder in a different judging role.

This Exodus context for Deut 25:11-12 sets the framework for any moral appraisal we might offer on its appropriateness and proportionality. The proportionality is set by the ‘eye for an eye’ principle of Exod 21:22f, but, of course, the woman has no male genitalia. The cutting off of the hand is not proportionate in the strict eye for an eye egalitarian manner of Exod 21:22f, but it evidently fits the offence insofar as it was the hand that took hold of the genitals. Had the punishment been something else, not involving the hands, then the fit with the offence would be lost. This is a kind of proportion.

The Hiphil form of the verb, ‘seize’, has overtones of ‘holding fast’ and ‘strength’ including the overpowering of the one who is being held. In Deuteronomy it is used for the holding down of a woman in rape (Deut 22:25). To this end, it seems that there is sexual intent in the injury to the genitals which is wilful. The measure we give to the verb is another way in which we can judge the proportionality of the punishment. There is damage involved in this act; it is not just a ‘grab’.

In the original law of Exod 21:22f the pregnant wife who becomes involved in the fight between two men may suffer injury and there may be loss of life, either of the child that is born as a consequence of the fight (miscarriage), or of the woman (or both). The presupposition of the Deuteronomy law is that there is injury and so the law proceeds to sanction. The two laws have in common ‘having children’: the woman in Exodus is pregnant, and in Deuteronomy there is implied damage to the man’s genitals.

Within the Law of Moses, the value placed on a man having children is the value that should inform the judgment as to whether Deut 25:11-12 is appropriate and proportionate. Having established the immediate legal context in Exod 21:22f and that Deut 25:11-12 is supplementing Exodus, and having established a presupposition of sexual intent and injury, we are in a position to evaluate the consistency of Deut 25:11-12 within its own system of laws, i.e. the Law of Moses. The wider context for this evaluation are the laws surrounding the having of children. If we agree that this is very important and that the Law promotes this value, we have a context for evaluating a sanction that applies to the damaging of male genitals.

We could argue that the Law is not consistent and that the cutting off of the hand is too lenient since it deprives a man of having children (the verb being interpreted in a strong sense of ‘overpower’). We could argue the law is too merciful in this sanction and that the sanction should be ‘life for life’. On the other hand, we might argue that the sanction is appropriate because no life is lost, only the potential for life. Would cutting off the hand be an appropriate and proportionate sanction within the terms of the Law?

One way to answer this is to look at other laws about male genitals: “A man with crushed or severed genitals may not enter the assembly of the Lord” (Deut 23:1). The cause of the condition of the man here is not noted but the consequence is highly significant. This law sets a context for judging whether the law in Deut 25:11-12 is consistent in its sanction; is it proportionate and appropriate? We might well say it is appropriate in being focused on the hand and its proportionality is set by its consequence, which would be exclusion from the assembly of the Lord.

So, the laws in the Law regarding mixed gender fights are reasonably consistent. Egalitarian proportionality is actually a feature of Exod 21:22f, but necessarily absent in Deut 25:11-12, as the woman has no male genitals. The appropriateness of cutting of the hand is consistent with the Law’s other surgery sanctions; it speaks to the offending limb. The proportionality of the sanction is in keeping with the consequence of exclusion from the assembly of the Lord.

The point of the preceding discussion is to show that the Law is consistent in its sanctions in this area (there is similar law (eye for an eye)) and it gives us value information to go along with those sanctions. The law is not about mutilating a woman; it is about a judicial sanction involving severing the hand.

New Testament

Is there a basis for appraising this law about the seizing of male genitalia in the NT? Someone might say that Jesus teaches, “If thy right hand offend thee cut it off…” (Matt 5:30) and this is the same sanction. However, this is obviously different as it is not set in a legal framework; it is for a person themselves to judge whether their hand ‘offends’ them and to cut it off. The law in Deuteronomy involves a judge and it is addressed to a third party (those who would implement the law); Jesus’ commandment is addressed to an individual. This is important because it means that Jesus does not share a commandment ‘to cut off the hand’ with the law in Deuteronomy: his commandment is for a person to cut off his own hand; the law is for a judge to implement a sanction that a woman’s hand be cut off. In terms of speech act theory, Jesus gives a commandment or even just guidance and advice in the second person (‘thy right hand’); but the law in Deuteronomy is part of a speech act that is the delivery of laws in the third person. (Put formally, Jesus does not share the commandment of Deut 25:11-12 because ‘cut your hand off’ is not ‘cut her hand off’.) The nature of the offence is not specified by Jesus and we have no way to know what might offend an individual so that they might then cut off their hand. So, whereas Jesus is clearly teaching his audience, teaching is not the point of the law in Deuteronomy; the point of the law is to attach a sanction to a kind of behaviour.

More generally, we might ask whether the New Testament has anything to say about the law of Deut 25:11-12. Is the God revealed through Jesus such that he cannot have given a law like that in Deuteronomy? We can cite commands of Jesus such as ‘Love thy neighbour’ (Matt 19:19, etc.), but these will not establish that God cannot have given the law in Deuteronomy; at most, they can only show that God’s commands for Christians are different.  One mistake to avoid here is to make the law into something more palatable because of our Christian convictions. We would be doing this if we supposed that the law was ‘really’ just about teaching a moral principle such as ‘If you fight you will hurt the ones you love’. This is an abstract moral principle, but whether we draw it from this law or not does not change the terms of the law. Abstract principles are not contradictory of the details in the expression of a law. It is a fallacy to argue that because a law teaches an abstract moral principle that it is not a law intended to govern society. The moral principle in our example could be something like, ‘Fight fair’. The point here is that extracting moral principles looks like something we do and we can probably think of several to hang on this law.

Any law in the Law of Moses may illustrate a moral principle (or several); in doing this, they are teaching about morality. There is no contrast here between a ‘teaching law’ and a ‘non-teaching law’ because we can probably see abstract moral principles underpinning all of the laws. The idea that some laws might not be for judicial execution contradicts the framework in which the laws are being delivered and the language in this case of ‘judges’ (Deut 25:1). We may find a law difficult, but the surrounding laws may be morally unobjectionable; the difficult law and the unobjectionable ones share the same framework of the delivery of law. Whether a law was implemented or not does not affect this point; the concept of ‘giving law’ necessarily involves judgment and an intention that the law should be applied in the appropriate circumstances. This is a point of difference with Jesus’ teaching and commands: they have application to individuals; the Law of Moses is a regulatory framework for a nation. Indeed, we might recognise hyperbole and exaggeration in Jesus’ command to cut off your own hand if it offends you, but the framework of law-giving in Deuteronomy 25 prevents that conclusion being drawn for the case of the woman who grabs hold of a man’s genitals in a three-way fight.

Jesus said,

You have heard that it has been said, ‘An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth’. But I say unto you, that you resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite you on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. Matt 5:38-39 (KJV revised)

Is Jesus giving the teaching intention of a law (the ‘eye for an eye’ laws), an intention which could have and should have been spiritually discerned by the Israelites? A first response to this question might be to say that Jesus’ teaching is clearly stated in a ‘But’ assertion, whereas there is no commentary/guidance in the Law itself which might aid a judge to waver the law. Another point is to say that if Jesus’ is not seeing an implicit waver in the expression of the law, is he now directing people to transcend the law by not invoking its ‘eye for an eye’ principle?

Jesus doesn’t quote the Law (Exod 21:24; Lev 24:20; Deut 19:21) but a proverb which is related to the Law (‘it has been said’). The proverb has no basis in the Law; it is about justifying violence against another person. The proverb may be a distortion of the Law but the laws that lay down the ‘eye for an eye’ control are not related to justifying violence; they are a specification of circumstance and a judicial sanction. Jesus is not commenting on this sanction or redress in the Law, in order to waver or transcend it, but what transpires in an act of violence (‘smite’).  Jesus’ is counselling the people not to return the blow that leads to a fight or to ‘getting your own back’.

There is an obvious difference between the ‘eye for an eye’ control in a judicial sanction and justifying violence on the basis of an ‘eye for an eye’. We cannot use Jesus’ teaching here to spiritual discern an unexpressed intention in the judicial sanction of one of the laws of Moses.

Reading the Law

How you read the Law can give rise to moral problems. You can read the Law for gaps in its expression and observe that, for example, no judicial process has been mentioned in the expression of this particular law. You might then say that the law is unjust. For example, there is no apparent judicial process in the law of Deut 13:6-11, but there is in the law of Deut 17:2-7 (“At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death.”). Is the absence of an evidential procedure in the expression of a law a proof that no evidential procedure was to be followed? The point is this: when laws of diverse sorts are given together, is it necessary to attach an evidential procedure to each law? This might be true of modern law-making, but it may have been understood that the law of evidence for capital crimes in Deut 17:2-7 had comprehensive scope for all capital crimes like that of Deut 13:6-11.

In fact, we can discern that Deut 17:6-7 is a general evidential bar (v. 6) and then a judicial procedure (v. 7) for capital crimes because it is expressed generally with the masculine singular pronominal suffix (‘he that is worthy of death’; ‘he shall not be put to death’; ‘upon him’) and attached to vv. 2-5; whereas the offence covered in Deut 17:2-5 is described in terms of men and women. Deuteronomy 17:6-7 has been attached to Deut 17:2-5, but equally this shows that it can be attached to other laws. It is therefore a mistake in the reading of the law of Deut 13:6-11 to say that it has only one witness (the victim) and no process. The word for ‘witness’ is not used and no evidential procedure is included in the law. The law couples the specification of the crime with a stipulation about the execution of the judicial procedure to wit that this involve the victim. Since the victim would be a witness, having suffered at first hand the crime, the law is expressed wholly consistently with the general evidential and judicial procedure of Deut 17:6-7. There is no contradictory contrast to be made and therefore no need to characterize the law of Deut 13-6-11 as something other than a law intended for practice, for example, by saying that it is only a law for teaching a principle.

As well as questioning a judicial process, its absence or difference with other laws, you might question the circumstances for the crime – you might say they are unrealistic. This might make you say that the law is unjust or morally at fault. This is obviously a more difficult judgment to make than simply saying there is no evidential procedure mentioned or that there is an objectionable judicial procedure. Taking the law of familial-idolatry in Deut 13:6-11 as our example, we can see how difficult it is to challenge the sociology of a law’s expression.

If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers; Namely, of the gods of the people which are round about you, nigh unto thee, or far off from thee, from the one end of the earth even unto the other end of the earth; Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him: But thou shalt surely kill him… (Deut 13:6-9 KJV)

This clearly fits the Law of Moses in terms of its concerns expressed elsewhere about idolatry; that there might be secret enticement is not an unusual or unreasonable possibility to envisage for human behaviour in the light of the strong position taken against idolatry in the Law elsewhere. This might encourage covert behaviours on the part of those taking up alternative beliefs. Equally, enticement inside close relationships looks entirely plausible and in keeping with what we know of human nature. It is more likely to happen inside families than between strangers because of the greater dangers. There doesn’t seem to be anything morally objectionable in the expression of the law.

It is worth contrasting some of Jesus’ teaching about family relationships: “If anyone comes to me, and hates not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple” (Luke 14:26). The principle Jesus teaches here, expressed with hyperbole, is obviously not the principle taught in the law of Deuteronomy 13 which is about idolatry. Moreover, whereas we can see that there is hyperbole in Jesus’ teaching (use of ‘hate’ for close family), there is no hyperbole in the law: ‘secret enticement’ being entirely plausible for the offence.

Drawing up the Laws

We have considered moral objections to the Law and used some examples to illustrate mis-reading of laws. Another kind of objection to the Law would be that the drawing-up of the laws is inconsistent. We might say that the Law is not a ‘good’ kind of law-making. Some laws are adequately expressed; other laws are not. We might, on the other hand, think that this judgment is unfair and rather modern, presupposing the standards we apply for law-making in our own society. The problem with making evaluative judgments here is well-known in social anthropology: it is the problem of understanding primitive societies without involving our Western cultural bias. How do we say and justify of another society that it is has expressed its laws inadequately by our standards?

How do we say that a law in the Law of Moses is not well-expressed? Take the law of the idolatrous city (Deut 13:12-18); this is expressed differently to the immediately preceding law concerning familial-idolatry (Deut 13:6-11). It includes a ‘searching out’ of the facts before any action (v. 14), whereas no such procedure is mentioned in the law of familial-idolatry, and yet both laws concern idolatry. Is this difference legitimate grounds for us making a criticism of the Law?

We have no jurisprudence from Israelite society to discuss standards acceptable to them for law-making. This is true for whatever view we take of the Law as regards its date(s) and whether we think of the Law as ‘from God’ or not. If we say that the Law is drawn up badly from our perspective, we have no evidence that it was regarded as such on the part of the Israelites, and nor do we have much case law to study. For all we know, the Law fell into abeyance, was changed, replaced, and added to, and so on, throughout the era of the Judges and Kings.

The point here is: how do we justify our insistence that any law have a minimum set of basic components? In the examples of the laws of city-idolatry (Deut 13:14) and personal-idolatry (Deut 17:4) there is specified an evidence-gathering process, but no such process is stipulated for the law of familial-idolatry. Do we have a basis here for saying that the law of familial-idolatry is inconsistent or defective or just badly drawn? Without case-law and without a history of the application of the laws to consider, we don’t actually know if the law of familial-idolatry was defective or regarded as deficient in the matter of evidence-gathering or in its evidential bar or judicial execution. In short, we need guidance on how to read the Law from the Law itself before giving a criticism.

Our discussion of the Law and some examples of its laws is a reasonably good demonstration that the Law is actually fit for purpose in respect of its familial-idolatry law. We are drawing in the principle of evidence-gathering, the notion of an evidential bar, a principle of witness testimony, and a judicial process from comparable laws. A theologian might criticize the Law for consistency, but a working judge would not, and it might have been well-understood that the Law was to be read as a whole for its principles of operation. Justification in English case-law proceeds, for example, from principles of jurisprudence as well as comparable law; case-law then acts as a precedent and eventually may be enshrined in Law. We can’t reasonably say that a law is badly drawn-up because it lacks a specification of evidence-gathering or a mention of the evidential bar of two or three witnesses, unless each of the laws in the Law of Moses were intended to be complete in themselves. This is not a standard that has applied in English Law, as case-law shows; we cannot criticize the Law of Moses on these grounds.

Divine and Human Values

The criticism to be considered now is the plain statement that, ‘It’s just wrong’. This is where our Western humanitarian moral values come into conflict with those in the Law. We might think that capital punishment is just wrong and criticize the Law accordingly. For example, take the law of rebellious children – they are to be put to death (Deut 21:18-21). The specification of the crime is “If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them”. We might say that it is just wrong to put a child to death on these (or any) grounds. We might not think it likely that this law was invoked by parents, but this fact does not affect any moral appraisal. We might even recall that in Israel’s history not many (if any) rebellious sons were dealt with according to this law, but again, this is irrelevant to our moral appraisal.

Someone might say that there is no way to meet this criticism: it is a clash of divine and human values. We might respond and say that the rebelliousness must have been extreme for the law to be applied; we might say that the law stands as a warning to parents and children to behave in loving and respectful ways towards each other so that this law never has to be invoked. These reactions are ways to ameliorate the basic clash of divine and human values – they don’t change the status or clarity of the law. This is an important point in interpretation: you can’t change the legal quality of the text because you don’t like the law; it remains a law. You don’t say, “I don’t like this law, so it can’t be a real law”, or “This law is so wrong, it must not be a real law”. It makes no sense within a body of laws to single out those that are morally objectionable and say that they are not laws as such, designed for use in society.

Take another example: suppose someone says that stoning is cruel and just wrong. It might be consistent with the Law and be proportionate and appropriate within the terms of the Law, but s/he may still press the objection and say stoning is just wrong. This looks like a simple clash of human and divine values, and perhaps it reflects a strong distaste for the implementation of stoning by a crowd. Again, it is possible to try and ameliorate the reality of stoning in the Law by saying that Jesus has shown a better way. He says, “He that is without sin, let him cast the first stone” (John 8:7), and since we are all sinners, we should not cast the first stone. However, this doesn’t overturn the Law because it presupposes that the judgment of stoning is legally sound. What Jesus’ remark addresses is, not the stoning, but the potential stoners. We cannot use Jesus’ remarks on the case of the ‘Woman caught in Adultery’ to say that stoning was not intended in the Law. We might consider stoning to be horrific and mob-like, but these are our characterizations and not those of Jesus.

Another response might be to observe that the context of the ANE, and more generally the context of human societies, shows the practice of capital punishment has been common. In fact, there are many practices in human societies that we might find morally objectionable, for example, child sacrifice. The question to ask here is whether the morally objectionable aspects of the Law are a reflection of divine values or the use of common values from the times. This accommodationist proposal rests on the evident fact that human societies down the ages have had practices which we would condemn from the point of view of our Western liberal values. If we freely condemn ourselves (viewing ‘ourselves’ as human beings living in societies down the ages), on what basis do we include God within that remit?

However, there is a deeper response to that of the accommodationist. First, for there to be a clash of divine and human values, the human side of the equation has to have a consistent story to tell, and secondly, we have to have a criterion for identifying the divine value being appraised. Human beings are morally ambivalent and do not have a consistent position to uphold. We may think that Western liberal values are superior but that is not a satisfactory basis for pitching up against God in an evaluation of divine and human values. Human beings have a history which they will not be able to defend. If we say to God of some law in the Law of Moses that ‘This is wrong’, he can say “Look at your own history” and he might well say “What you say is wrong is not my value, it is your own”.

The moral appraisal of the Law of Moses has, first, to identify divine values. The laws were given within a human society and for that society; but there is no accompanying moral narrative in many cases. Take the most famous principle of the Law, an ‘eye for an eye’, what is the moral principle here – is it good or bad? We might justify it on egalitarian grounds; equally we might criticize it by saying the law should not mirror the violence of the offence; the law should seek to correct and educate. Whatever we say, we have not solved the problem of identifying not just whether the ‘eye for an eye’ principle expresses a divine value but actually what it is that is the divine value. Is it a value of retribution, of deterrence, of egalitarian recompense, or of correction, or something else? To return to our first example, what is the divine value in the law of ‘Seizing Genitals’ (if there is one) that is morally objectionable?

The question here is not about whether there should be a law about wives getting involved in fights; nor is it about whether the law should proscribe a move such as the seizing of genitals; the question is about the proportionality of the cutting off of the hand. If we say this would be mutilation, we introduce a value-laden description; if we say that it is amputation, we leave the moral question open. The proportionality of the punishment may be consistent with the Law, but what (if any) value does it reflect about the human body on the part of God? If we value the human body differently to God, which of us is right?

Conclusion

We can look at a law in the Law of Moses and say that it is morally objectionable. We can go looking for ways to defend the Law against such an attack. There are some ‘dead ends’ to avoid which we have identified. Can the issue be resolved? The question seems to come down to,

Wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. Rom 7:12 (KJV)

But who are you, a man, to answer back to God? Will what is moulded say to its moulder: Why have you made me thus? (Rom 9:20, RSV).