Marian Hillar is Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies and of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at Texas Southern University. He is not a believer. He is editor-in-chief of Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism. In his book he questions the existence of Jesus (p. 2), denies a temporal beginning to the universe (p. 13), and his first reference is to the New Atheists (p. 1, n1). Throughout the work are sporadic insults against Christianity. His agenda is not the restoration of primitive Christianity but, seemingly, to explain away Christian religion. Inasmuch as he regards the Trinity as a later development in Christian thought prompted by Greek philosophy and Egyptian religion, his book is of some value to biblical monotheists, however there is much here for readers to disagree with.
Whilst it is impressive that Hillar has mastered the musical chairs of his professorships, one wonders whether he has overextended himself. This work encompasses a range of disciplines, necessarily so for its broad remit, but it would be an accomplished polymath who could master these various strands successfully. For myself I would query to what extent Hillar has been successful.
The first chapter covers the Greek philosophers from Pythagoras to first century Stoicism but Hillar gives little consideration to the methodological problems associated with such historical endeavours. For example, our historical knowledge of Pythagoras is very slender and much of Pythagorean doctrine is, in fact, that of later followers. Plato, whose works are extant, is not as straightforward as Hillar proposes. There is some development from his early to late dialogues, and it is not always obvious whether one set of ideas can or should be reconciled with another; Hillar does not mention the unwritten doctrines of Plato (recorded by Aristotle). More importantly, it is not obvious what Hillar hopes to achieve by this summary, since he makes little use of this material in later chapters.
The second chapter covers “The Logos in Judaism”, though it gives only short summary of the Hebrew word davar (p. 36-37) and spends most of the chapter considering Philo. This is because Hillar believes that several Christian writers, Justin in particular, were influenced by the writings of Philo. This conclusion, though defended by early twentieth century scholars like Goodenough and Wolfson, is now out of date. The scholarly consensus is currently that Justin, whilst conversant with Hellenistic Judaism, did not know the works of Philo.
The third and fourth chapters trace the development of the Messianic tradition. Whilst he briefly acknowledges OT motives for Messianism, he devotes most of his consideration to apocalyptic literature. His purpose is revealed in chapter four when he seeks to explain the origins of Christianity as a Jewish Messianic sect, probably an apocalyptic group like that at Qumran, with Jesus and most of the NT being a later invention prompted by the mystery religions. Hillar seems to give no historical credence to the NT, but gives paramount significance to the fourth century writer Epiphanius (p. 112f), who is notoriously unreliable. His account of Jesus (p. 135-7) comes from the far fringes of scholarship, beyond even the ‘Jesus Seminar’ research group of American scholars. The contrast between his treatment of Pythagoras and that of Jesus is striking.
The next two chapters are devoted to Justin, his Logos doctrine, and his relationship to the Neo-Pythagorean thinker, Numenius of Apamea. Numenius posited a hierarchy of three gods and there is at least a case to be made that Justin was influenced by Numenius, or someone of this mold. Hillar notes some formal parallels but seems to give no consideration to the question of whether direct influence is plausible and how that might be detected. His analysis of Numenius is itself not unproblematic; he refers frequently to the “Logos of Numenius” though Numenius did not write about the Logos. One suspects Hillar may be unduly influenced by Guthrie’s poor translation of Numenius, which he frequently cites.
Chapters seven and eight are devoted to Tertullian, whom Hillar brands “the originator of the Trinity”. However it is far from obvious, even on Hillar’s own analysis, that Tertullian did originate the Trinity. Whilst he wrote about three persona in one substantia¸ it is questionable whether he regarded the three as co-equal or co-eternal; Tertullian seems to believe the Son was created in time. Tertullian is credited with coining the term trinitas but Hillar acknowledges that the earlier Theophilus used the Greek term trias. More importantly, if Hillar wants to credit Tertullian with originating the Trinity then presumably he should present some evidence of the influence Tertullian had on later theologians but he does not. It is also frustrating that Hillar frequently describes Tertullian as being influenced by Stoicism and Egyptian religion but presents little by way of evidence that Tertullian was conversant in either tradition or was prompted by them to formulate his theology.
The final chapter is ostensibly about Thomas Aquinas, but is really a summary of Trinitarian doctrine from Tertullian to the present day. An appendix includes some claims about Israelite polytheism and then some summaries of Egyptian triads.
The general thesis of the book is that the development of the doctrine of the Trinity was influenced by Greek philosophy. I am sympathetic to this view; indeed my own research is concerned with this question. However, I do not think Hillar has achieved his objective. Whilst the book summarises various aspects of Greek philosophy, Jewish religion and some early Christian thought, it is only really his chapters on Justin that propose any direct influence between Greek philosophy and Christian thought, and these connections are underdeveloped. Though one might argue that Justin was formative in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity (this is my view), it is conceivable that Justin was exceptional and the Trinity developed from other sources. It is also conceivable that Justin knew nothing of Numenius, despite the parallels, and developed his doctrine from other sources. Convergence (or coincidence) is not the same as causation, and Hillar does not demonstrate causation.
Anthony Buzzard writes in the foreword to this book,
“a scholar well versed both in the two biblical testaments and in the Greek philosophical schools of late antiquity has set his hand to provide us with just the information we need for an intelligent assessment of the pristine Christianity that preceded its remarkable deterioration from the second century” (p. ix).
I’m afraid I do not share Buzzard optimistic assessment. Hillar does not believe the “pristine Christianity” ever existed and I am not confident that he has provided us with the basis for assessing how Christianity adopted the Trinity. I welcome Hillar’s contribution, insofar as it may renew interest in the role of Greek philosophy in second century Christian triadology, but I suspect it will not lead to “an almost complete rewriting of theological history” as Buzzard hopes (p. x).
Review of “The Early Earth” by John Whitcomb (1972)